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MINIMUM PHYSICAL STANDARDS-SAFEGUARDING THE
RIGHTS OF PROTECTIVE SERVICE WORKERS
UNDER THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT
INTRODUCTION
In 1967, Congress formally addressed the growing problem of age dis-
crimination in the workplace when it passed the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA").I The ADEA makes it illegal for employ-
ers to use age as the primary employment criterion in both hiring and
termination situations.2 Its principal purpose is to ensure that employ-
ment determinations are based on objective, age-neutral criteria such as
individual ability, and not on subjective, unsubstantiated age-based pre-
sumptions.3 Employment decisions predicated on stereotyped assump-
tions concerning the degenerative effects of aging on performance and
ability are thus prohibited under the Act.4
Although the ADEA protects most employees over the age of 40,5 cer-
tain persons are not covered. Specifically, most state and local govern-
ment protective service workers such as law enforcement officers and
firefighters,6 the focus of this Note, face mandatory retirement at age 55
as a result of the 1986 amendments to the ADEA.7 Federal law enforce-
1. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
634 (1982)).
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1982). For a general discussion of the ADEA's sub-
stantive provisions, see C. Edelman & I. Siegler, Federal Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Law: Slowing Down the Golden Watch 73-241 (1978).
3. See EEOC v. University of Texas Health Science Center, 710 F.2d 1091, 1094
(5th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. County of Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1982);
H.R. Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1967 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 2213, 2214.
4. See Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 755 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983); County of Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d at 376; Aaron v. Davis,
414 F. Supp. 453, 461 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
5. The ADEA originally applied only to private sector employers with more than
twenty-five employees. In 1974, Congress expanded the definition of "employer" to in-
clude the federal government as well as state and local governments. See The Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(2), 88 Stat. 55, 74.
6. The term "protective service" worker or "employee" encompasses firefighters;
traditional law enforcement personnel such as police officers, state troopers and highway
patrolmen; and non-traditional law enforcement personnel such as conservation officers
and highway tax enforcement officers. The common characteristic shared by these em-
ployees is their principal job function-the promotion of third party or public safety.
7. See The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-592, § 3(a)(i), 100 Stat. 3342 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623(i) (Supp. IV
1986)). Although Congress removed the ADEA's upper age limit in 1986, see id. § 2(c),
effectively eliminating mandatory retirement for most workers, it created an exception for
non-federal law enforcement officers and firefighters which exempts them from the Act's
protection. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(i) (Supp. IV 1986). State and local governments are now
free to enforce the mandatory retirement of firefighters and law enforcement officers, or
to refuse to hire an applicant for such positions, solely on the basis of age. See id. Be-
cause the amendment is self-repealing, however, firefighters and law enforcement officers
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ment agents, firefighters and air traffic controllers also are not protected
by the Act.'
In addition to the exemption of specific classes of employees, the
ADEA provides affirmative defenses to charges of age discrimination.
The most frequently invoked9 of these defenses is the bona fide occupa-
tional qualification ("BFOQ") exception."° This exception has generated
much litigation,' especially in the protective service' 2 and transporta-
tion"3 industries-areas in which public safety concerns are of manifest
will again be subject to ADEA protection as of January 1, 1994. See Pub. L. No. 99-592,
§ 3(b), 100 Stat. 3342 (1986).
The provisional exclusion of firefighters and law enforcement officers from the ADEA,
however, does not render the issue of minimum physical standards for protective service
employees moot. See infra note 34 (discussing concept of minimum physical standards).
First, the amendment contains a savings clause which preserves all claims arising before
January 1, 1987. See Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 7(b), 100 Stat. 3342, 3345 (1986).
Second, the scope of the amendment is unclear because not all protective service work-
ers are specifically included within the definitions established under the amendment. The
term "law enforcement officer" is not precisely defined. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(k) (Supp. IV
1986). For example, it is unclear whether conservation officers fall within this category.
At least one court has suggested that they do not. See EEOC v. Tennessee Wildlife Re-
sources Agency, 859 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1988) (In its companion case, EEOC v. Kentucky
State Police Department, 860 F.2d 665 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2066
(1989), the court specifically noted that plaintiffs action was preserved under the savings
clause. Id. at 669. In EEOC v. Tennessee, reference to the savings clause was omitted,
suggesting that it was not needed to preserve the claim because it was not affected by the
1986 amendment.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1342 (1989). Exactly what occupations fall
within the definitions under the amendment is certain to be the focus of prospective litiga-
tion. See, e.g., EEOC v. Massachusetts, 680 F. Supp. 455 (D. Mass. 1988) (holding that
Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles examiners are "law enforcement officers" for
purposes of the 1986 ADEA amendments), afl'd, 858 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1988). As courts
answer this question, protective service employees held still to be protected under the
ADEA are certain to bring actions challenging mandatory retirement statutes, thereby
preserving the significance of the minimum physical standards question.
Finally, the validity of physical fitness tests as indicators of the ability of firefighters
and law enforcement officers to perform their jobs is currently being studied by the Secre-
tary of Labor and the EEOC, with Congress to be advised accordingly. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 622(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
8. See 5 U.S.C. § 8335 (1982). Fire-fighters and law enforcement agents are subject
to mandatory retirment at the age of 55 or after the completion of "20 years of service if
then over that age." Id. § 8335(b). Air traffic controllers are generally subject to
mandatory retirement at age 56. See id. § 8335(a).
9. See Rosenblum, Age Discrimination in Employment and the Permissibility of Oc-
cupational Age Restrictions, 32 Hastings L.J. 1261, 1266 (1981).
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1982).
11. See Retirement Policies For Public Safety Officials: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 217-
20 (1986) [hereinafter Retirement Policies] (partial list of lawsuits filed by the EEOC
against state and local protective service employers).
12. See id.
13. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985) (commercial
airline); Iervolino v. Delta Air Lines, 796 F.2d 1408 (11th Cir. 1986) (same), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1090 (1987); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976)
(intercity bus carrier).
AGE DISCRIMINATION
importance. 14
The BFOQ exception authorizes employers to discriminate on the ba-
sis of age "where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business."15 An em-
ployer invoking the exception concedes that age was the determinative
factor in its decision, but seeks to legitimate the decision by showing that
it was "necessary given the nature of the business."1 6 Under the excep-
tion, an employer can rebut a plaintiff's claim of age discrimination by
proving that it is compelled to rely on age as a proxy for particular job
qualifications.' 7
The ADEA and its legislative history do not articulate the standard
employers must meet in order to exculpate themselves under the BFOQ
defense when public safety considerations are involved." Consequently,
interpretation of the BFOQ exception has been left to the federal judici-
ary. Under a two-pronged 9 test formulated by the Fifth Circuit in Usery
v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.,2 and formally adopted by the Supreme
Court in Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell,21 (the Tamiami/Criswell
standard), a safety-related job qualification will qualify as a BFOQ when
the employer demonstrates two points. First, the qualification must be
reasonably necessary to the essence of the employer's business.22 Second,
there must be a factual basis, predicated on empirical data, for the em-
ployer's believing either (a) that all or substantially all persons over the
specified age possess characteristics precluding safe or efficient perform-
ance of the duties of the job involved, or (b) that individualized assess-
14. See Note, The BFOQ Defense in ADEA Suits: The Scope of "Duties of the Job, " 85
Mich. L. Rev. 330, 333 n.21 (1986).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1982).
16. EEOC v. County of Allegheny, 519 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (W.D. Pa. 1981), afl'd,
705 F.2d 679 (3d Cir. 1983).
17. Once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA,
the burden shifts to the defendant to furnish evidence justifying its actions under one of
the Act's defenses. See EEOC v. New Jersey, 631 F. Supp. 1506, 1507 (D.N.J. 1986),
affid, 815 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1987); Marshall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588,
591 (5th Cir. 1978); Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453, 460 (E.D. Ark. 1976); cf McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (Title VII plaintiff bears initial
burden of establishing prima facie case of race discrimination whereupon burden shifts to
employer "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's re-
jection."). See generally Schickman, The Strengths and Weaknesses of the McDonnell
Douglas Formula in Jury Actions Under the ADEA, 32 Hastings L.J. 1239 (1981) (general
discussion of burdens of proof under ADEA).
18. See Note, Striking a Balance Between the Interests of Public Safety and the Rights
of Older Workers: The Age BFOQ Defense, 39 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1371, 1374-75
(1982); see also infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
19. The two prongs of the standard are not mutually exclusive-the employer must
satisfy its burden under both prongs. These prongs must be addressed sequentially-
reaching the second prong is dependent upon the employer's meeting its evidentiary bur-
den under the first. See EEOC v. Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency, 859 F.2d 24, 25
(6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1342 (1989).
20. 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
21. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
22. See Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 235-36; Criswell, 472 U.S. at 413-17.
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ments of most persons over the designated age are either impossible or
impractical.23
The "reasonable necessity" requirement under the first prong guaran-
tees that the asserted occupational qualification is more than incidentally
related to the essence of the employer's business.2 4 The second prong
ensures that the employer is compelled to rely on age as a proxy for the
qualification asserted under the first prong, foreclosing the possibility of
employment decisions absent reference to age.2
Although the BFOQ defense was intended "'to be an extremely nar-
row exception to the general prohibition' of age discrimination contained
in the ADEA,"'2 6 courts have suggested that where public safety is the
essence of an employer's business, the employer faces a less stringent evi-
dentiary burden than it would normally face in satisfying the Tamiami!
Criswell standard.27 A corollary to this conclusion is that employers
have broader discretion to impose more stringent job requirements when
risks to public safety are involved.2" This relaxed burden and the in-
23. See Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 235-36; Criswell, 472 U.S. at 413-17.
24. See EEOC v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n, 848 F.2d 526, 534 (5th Cir. 1988)
(Jones, J., specially concurring), vacated and remanded, 873 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1989).
In cases where the essence of the employer's business is public safety, the inquiry under
the first prong "'adjusts to the safety factor' by ensuring that the employer's restrictive
job qualifications are 'reasonably necessary' to further the overriding interest in public
safety." Criswell, 472 U.S. at 413.
25. See Criswell, 472 U.S. at 414.
Although the BFOQ exception is one of several affirmative defenses available under the
ADEA, it is the only one which allows the employer to rely exclusively on age in making
its employment decisions. Two other defenses-differentiations based on "reasonable
factors other than age," 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1982), and dismissal or disciplinary action
for "good cause," id. § 623(f)(3)-play an interesting role regarding the implementation
of minimum physical standards. See infra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
For a thorough discussion of the defenses available under the ADEA, see Player, De-
fenses Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Misinterpretation, Misdirection,
and the 1978 Amendments, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 747 (1978).
26. Criswell, 472 U.S. at 412 (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334
(1977)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (1988) ("It is anticipated that this concept of a
[BFOQ] will have limited scope and application.").
27. See Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 675 F.2d 842, 845 (6th Cir. 1982); Maki v. Com-
missioner of Educ., 568 F. Supp. 252, 254-55 (N.D.N.Y. 1983), af'd, 742 F.2d 1437 (2d
Cir. 1984); Hoefelman v. Conservation Comm'n, 541 F. Supp. 272, 275 (W.D. Mo. 1982),
aff'd, 718 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1983); Beck v. Borough of Manheim, 505 F. Supp. 923, 925
(E.D. Pa. 1981); cf Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 1974)
(employer had to demonstrate only a "rational basis in fact" for its belief that suspension
of its maximum hiring age for inter-city bus drivers would increase the "likelihood of risk
of harm to its passengers"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
Although the employer's burden of proof is apparently reduced for occupations impli-
cating public safety, the ADEA still requires empirical evidence demonstrating a correla-
tion between the specified age limitation and the particular job involved. See Aaron v.
Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453, 461 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
28. See EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447, 450 (8th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1985); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236
(5th Cir. 1976); cf. Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98, 101 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (airline industry afforded wide discretion in determining which methods of opera-
tion will optimize safety), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
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creased judicial deference to employer determinations purportedly repre-
sent a compromise between two competing and arguably irreconcilable
interests: promoting the employment of qualified older individuals under
the ADEA versus effectively addressing employers' concerns for the
safety of third persons.2 9
Effectively balancing these considerations has proved difficult when
public safety is implicated, leading some courts to accord undue defer-
ence to employers' averments that their asserted job qualifications are
reasonably related to the essence of their business.3 0 This reduced evi-
dentiary burden and the concomitant sanctioning of a greater degree of
employer discretion in the selection of mandatory retirement ages and
occupational qualifications, however, "[do] not relieve the defendant of
its burden of establishing both elements of the BFOQ defense."'"
The BFOQ exception is invoked frequently by protective service em-
ployers seeking to validate statutory entry-level age limits and mandatory
retirement ages. 2 Unfortunately, the conflict between promoting public
29. See EEOC v. County of Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1982);
Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 239-40 (Brown, C.J., concurring).
30. See, e.g., EEOC v. City of E. Providence, 798 F.2d 524, 529 & n.4 (1st Cir. 1986);
EEOC v. Missouri, 748 F.2d at 450; Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859,
862-63 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); Spurlock v. United Airlines,
Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir. 1972); see also Note, A New Interpretation of the BFOQ
Exception Under the ADEA: A Remedy for the Exception that Swallowed the Rule, 31
Am. U.L. Rev. 391, 400 (1982) (courts have shown undue sympathy to employers' claims
of public safety, leading to an "unacceptably broad reading" of the BFOQ exception).
31. Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 596 F. Supp. 939, 945 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), afld, 770 F.2d
12 (2d Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
32. See, e.g., EEOC v. Kentucky State Police Dep't, 860 F.2d 665, 666 (6th Cir. 1988)
(retirement age of 55 for state police officers), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2066 (1989); EEOC
v. Mississippi, 837 F.2d 1398, 1399 (5th Cir. 1988) (retirement age of 62 and maximum
hiring age of 35 for state conservation officers); EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d 392, 393
(3d Cir. 1987) (retirement age of 60 for state police officers), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1109
(1988); EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447, 448 (8th Cir. 1984) (re-
tirement age of 60 and maximum hiring age of 32 for state highway patrolmen), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1985); see also Retirement Policies, supra note 11, at 217-20 (listing
ADEA cases filed by the EEOC).
Protective service employers characteristically advance the same arguments, contend-
ing that health and physical fitness are integral job qualifications under the first prong of
the Tamiami/Criswell standard because the essence of their business is the promotion of
public safety. See, e.g., EEOC v. Missouri, 748 F.2d at 451-55; EEOC v. State Dep't of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 660 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 (N.D. Fla. 1986). They
argue that aging catalyzes an array of physiological changes which lead to an overall
physical degeneration and have a negative effect on the ability of protective service em-
ployees to perform their jobs. See, e.g., EEOC v. Missouri, 748 F.2d at 452; EEOC v.
Pennsylvania, 645 F. Supp. 1545, 1550-52 (M.D. Pa. 1986), vacated and remanded, 829
F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1109 (1988); EEOC v. Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Bd., 565 F. Supp. 520, 522 (E.D. Pa. 1983); cf Houghton v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 413 F. Supp. 1230, 1236-37 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (description of age-related
physical degeneration which negatively affects ability of airplane pilots), rev'd on other
grounds, 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977).
The results reached in these cases are "'all over the lot'[, however,] with little consis-
tency seen even between cases in which the 'essence of the business' appears to be identi-
cal." EEOC v. New Jersey, 620 F. Supp. 977, 982 (D.N.J. 1985). A major reason for the
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safety and eradicating ageism in employment has generated confusion
regarding the nature and quantum of evidence that employers must ad-
duce to successfully invoke the exception.
Courts disagree whether employers must develop and enforce mini-
mum standards of health and physical fitness3 3 to prove that such qualifi-
cations are reasonably necessary to the essence of their business, and to
defend their enforcement of mandatory retirement ages on that basis.
The split essentially turns on whether the failure to implement and en-
force minimum physical standards is merely evidence of an employer's
lack of commitment to the continued health and fitness of its employees,
or whether this failure is so probative as to compel the finding that, as a
matter of law, physical fitness is not reasonably necessary to the essence
of its business. 34
lack of judicial agreement is the fact-specific nature of the cases. See id.; Stewart v.
Smith, 673 F.2d 485, 491 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Thus, mandatory retirement schemes for
similar types of protective service employees have been held valid in some jurisdictions
and violative of the ADEA in others. See Nelson & Roberts, Mandatory Retirement and
Police Employment, 14 J. Police Sci. & Admin. 6, 7-8 (1986); Retirement Policies, supra
note 11, at 137-38. It is not anomalous for courts to reach divergent conclusions, how-
ever, when they cannot agree on the nature and degree of evidence that will satisfy the
Tamiami/Criswell standard. See infra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
33. The development and implementation of minimum physical standards involves
establishing a program for maintaining the physical fitness of all employees, regardless of
age. The fundamental component is a complete annual physical examination to ensure
that all employees possess a threshold level of physical and medical fitness and to identify
individuals with obvious health risks that either exclude them from continued employ-
ment or which preclude further testing for specific physical attributes such as strength
and aerobic capacity. Following this initial screening, employees should be tested for
compliance with the level of physical ability required for the safe and successful perform-
ance of their particular duties.
Assessment of an employee's fitness for his particular job involves an initial identifica-
tion of the tasks that are performed in that job, followed by a determination of the physi-
ological attributes such as strength, endurance and aerobic capacity necessary for the safe
and efficient performance of those tasks. See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 645 F. Supp. 1545,
1547-50 (M.D. Pa. 1986), vacated and remanded, 829 F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 108 S. Ct. 1109 (1988); EEOC v. New Jersey, 631 F. Supp. 1506, 1510 (D.N.J.
1986), aft'd, 815 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1987). An employee who fails to meet the requisite
standards for his job responsibilities should face disciplinary action such as temporary
suspension, reassignment to lighter duty, or transfer to a position for which he is physi-
cally qualified if the failure is based on a correctable condition. Individuals who are
permanently disabled or who possess ailments such as diagnosed heart conditions, which
may completely preclude the safe and efficient performance of their present duties, should
either be mandatorily retired or, if possible, reassigned to a position involving only mini-
mal physical exertion.
The institution of minimum physical standards through a comprehensive physical fit-
ness program is possible. See EEOC v. New Jersey, 631 F. Supp. at 1508 (New Jersey's
state police have instituted a full-scale program for all sworn officers); Retirement Poli-
cies, supra note 11, at 38 (as of 1986, "[a]t least 18 states have physical fitness/health
programs for state law enforcement officers" and at least 10 major cities have instituted
physical fitness/training programs). In fact, the institution of some type of continued
physical fitness standard is becoming more prevalent, usually implemented through labor
agreements. See id. at 108-17.
34. Compare EEOC v. City of E. Providence, 798 F.2d 524, 530 (Ist Cir. 1986) (ab-
sence of minimum physical standards does not bar finding that health and fitness are
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In the First35 and Eighth3 6 Circuits, a protective service employer's
failure to implement minimum physical standards for all employees does
not preclude a finding that health and physical fitness are BFOQs. In
these circuits, an employer can validate its mandatory retirement policy
under the second prong of the BFOQ test by relying primarily on evi-
dence concerning the diminished ability of older workers to perform
their jobs.37 There is no corresponding requirement that the employer
empirically corroborate its subjective belief that most employees below
the mandatory retirement age actually possess the level of health and
fitness it has labeled essential.3"
Under the approach taken in the Third39 and Sixth'0 Circuits, con-
versely, an employer is expressly prevented from establishing health and
physical stamina as BFOQs unless minimum physical standards are de-
reasonably necessary job qualifications) with EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d 392, 395
(3d Cir. 1987) (health and physical fitness cannot be reasonably necessary job qualifica-
tions until minimum physical standards are implemented), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1109
(1988).
Correctly characterizing the nature of the failure to implement minimum physical
standards is critical. If it is merely evidence that physical fitness is not reasonably neces-
sary to the essence of the employer's business operation, the court will usually make an
inquiry under the second prong of the Tamiami/Criswell standard. Under this prong, the
employer can then introduce evidence regarding the difficulties in individually monitor-
ing health and fitness in order to legitimize its failure to implement minimum standards.
Conversely, if the absence of these standards thoroughly contradicts the employer's claim
that physical fitness is reasonably necessary to the essence of its business, the court must
terminate its inquiry and invalidate the employer's mandatory retirement scheme under
the first prong of the standard without ever making an inquiry under the second prong.
35. See EEOC v. City of E. Providence, 798 F.2d 524 (1st Cir. 1986).
36. See EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1985).
37. See City of E. Providence, 798 F.2d at 528; EEOC v. Missouri, 748 F.2d at 455.
A major area of contention is the meaning of the term "occupational qualification."
Courts disagree whether the term applies to the particular duties performed by an indi-
vidual employee, or to the duties performed by the generic class of employees. See Maho-
ney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35, 38-39 (1st Cir.) (purportedly adopted an intermediate
standard focusing on "recognized and discrete vocation[s]" within the business-analysis
by rank or job category-but actually eschewed a particularistic analysis and imposed a
general BFOQ for all employees, regardless of current position or rank), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1036 (1984); EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1162, 1165-66 (8th Cir. 1982)
(proffered qualifications must be reasonably necessary to the essence of employee's partic-
ular job, rather than to generic class of employees); EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d
1254, 1258 (7th Cir. 1980) (term applies to duties of generic class of employees and not
discrete duties performed by an individual employee; where public safety is implicated, an
employer may be overly cautious in requiring that all personnel be able to perform all
jobs in that business). See generally Note, supra note 14 (analyzing this three-way split);
Note, The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Exception-Clarifying the Meaning of
"Occupational Qualification," 38 Vand. L. Rev. 1345 (1985) (same).
38. See, e.g., City of E. Providence, 798 F.2d at 529 n.4.
39. See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1109 (1988).
40. See EEOC v. Kentucky State Police Dep't, 860 F.2d 665 (6th Cir. 1988); EEOC
v. Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency, 859 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 2066 (1989).
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veloped and enforced on a full-scale, non-discriminatory basis.41 On this
side of the dispute, public safety considerations alone are not sufficiently
probative of whether the protective service employer's alleged job qualifi-
cations are reasonably necessary to the essence of its business. Rather,
the imposition of physical standards for older workers through compul-
sory retirement, coupled with the failure to implement minimum physi-
cal standards for younger officers, is tantamount to a "selective age-based
enforcement of health and fitness requirements,"'42 which the ADEA ex-
pressly prohibits. Consequently, mandatory retirement policies which do
not require minimum physical standards for all employees have been in-
validated because their effect in promoting public safety does not out-
weigh the violation of the rights of older employees under the ADEA.
In addition, a third approach was recently announced by the Fifth Cir-
cuit, which has held that the weight to be given a protective service em-
ployer's failure to implement minimum physical standards "is for the
fact finder to decide, with its finding subject to appropriate appellate re-
view on the entire record."43 Under this formulation, a court could hold
either that the employer's failure to implement minimum physical stan-
dards invalidates that employer's mandatory retirement policy or that
the absence of minimum physical standards, without more, does not pre-
41. The dispositive significance of an employer's failure to implement minimum stan-
dards for assessing the health and fitness of all employees has also been observed by other
courts. See Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1984) (defend-
ant's failure to subject any officers to periodic physical examinations cast doubt on "genu-
ineness" of its concern with physical fitness of its employees and belied claim that
youthfulness was a prerequisite for county police officers), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027
(1985); EEOC v. State Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 660 F. Supp. 1104,
1110 (N.D. Fla. 1986) ("Finally, and perhaps most telling, is the fact that despite all its
claims of concern about the physical fitness of troopers, FHP does not even require troop-
ers to undergo any physical examination once they are employed."); EEOC v. New
Jersey, 620 F. Supp. 977, 983-84 (D.N.J. 1985) (had defendant made no attempt to moni-
tor fitness of officers and allowed those with known physical disabilities to remain on
force, reasonable necessity of requirements of good health and physical conditioning
would have been suspect).
42. EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d at 395.
43. EEOC v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n, 873 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1989). The
Fifth Circuit had originally adopted the approach taken by the Third and Sixth Circuits.
See EEOC v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n, 848 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated and
remanded, 873 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1989); EEOC v. Mississippi, 837 F.2d 1398 (5th Cir.
1988). The Fifth Circuit recently reconsidered its position, however, and declined "to
hold that physical fitness can never be held to be reasonably necessary for job perform-
ance unless the employer has established formal standards and monitoring procedures."
EEOC v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n, 873 F.2d at 98. Specifically, the court held that
the importance to be accorded an absence of minimum physical standards was to be left
to the fact finder, to be determined on a case-by-case basis. See id. at 99. In re-evaluating
its position, however, the Fifth Circuit explicitly refused to disturb its holding in EEOC v.
Mississippi. Consequently, although the Fifth Circuit apparently has departed from the
hard line approach of the Third and Sixth Circuits, that approach can still be adopted by
a Fifth Circuit fact finder as long as the court examines each case according to its own
specific set of facts.
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vent an employer from establishing health and physical fitness as
BFOQs.
This Note asserts that for protective service employers to avail them-
selves of the BFOQ exception as defined by the Tamiami/Criswell stan-
dard, they must implement minimum physical standards for all
employees. Part I demonstrates that the failure to implement uniform
minimum physical standards leads to an over-broad construction of the
BFOQ exception, contravening congressional intent in promulgating the
ADEA, as evidenced by the Act's legislative history and the interpretive
bulletins issued to counsel in its administration. Part II traces the devel-
opment of the Tamiami/Criswell standard and concludes that minimum
physical standards and periodic testing are required by the case law
which defines the contours of the standard. Part III analyzes the general
arguments advanced by protective service employers and concludes that
the Third, Fifth and Sixth Circuits are correct in mandating the imple-
mentation of minimum physical standards. This section also demon-
strates that the use of minimum physical standards may reduce the
evidentiary problems faced by employers under both prongs of the
BFOQ test, and that these standards may render the BFOQ defense su-
perfluous in many protective service cases.
I. THE ADEA-TExT, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND INTERPRETIVE
GUIDELINES
In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196444
("CRA") in order to eradicate unlawful discrimination in the workplace.
Although Congress originally considered including a proscription against
age discrimination in Title VII, 45 references to age were dropped from
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). Title VII targets discriminatory employ-
ment practices based on race, religion, sex or national origin. See id. § 2000e-2.
45. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2596-99 (1964) (amendment sponsored by Rep. Dowdy); 110
Cong. Rec. 9911-16 (1964) (amendment sponsored by Sen. Smathers). These amend-
ments were rejected 123-94 and 63-28, respectively. See Eglit, The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act's Forgotten Affirmative Defense: The Reasonable Factors Other Than
Age Exception, 66 B.U.L. Rev. 155, 161 n.16 (1986). For a discussion of the relationship
between Title VII and the ADEA, see Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 380 (1976).
The reason for this rejection is unclear. In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 229
(1983), the Supreme Court posited that opposition to the amendments was based, in part,
on Congress' lack of information "about the nature of age discrimination." What is ap-
parent, however, is that age discrimination traditionally has been considered less insidi-
ous than the types of discrimination targeted by Title VII. See Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (per curiam); see also 113 Cong. Rec.
34,742 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Burke) (distinguishing age discrimination from that based
on race, creed and bigotry-the latter is based on perceptions totally unrelated to an
individual's ability to do his job while the former is based on assumptions concerning
efflects of aging on job performance); Eglit, supra, at 220 (discussing Rep. Burke's re-
marks).
Although it is anomalous to suggest that age discrimination is more tolerable because it
is based on misguided assumptions rather than broad-based animus, this difference in
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the final version of the statute.46
Competent older workers, however, were being forced out of the work-
place on the basis of assumptions regarding the correlation between age
and diminished ability.47 The growing national concern with the plight
of older workers culminated in the enactment of the ADEA.48 Although
tripartite in purpose,49 the ADEA's primary objective is the promotion
of employment opportunities for older workers through the elimination
of ageism in employment. ° It mandates that employment decisions be
based on individualized, age-neutral assessments of ability."
Despite the ADEA's sweeping proscription of arbitrary age discrimi-
perception has led some courts to conclude that because age discrimination is less offen-
sive, an employer's claims that it is acting in good faith are sufficient to sustain an age-
based ADEA BFOQ defense. See, e.g., EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254, 1258-
59 (7th Cir. 1980); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
46. Section 715 of the CRA instructed Secretary of Labor Wirtz to study the problem
and its consequences and transmit his findings to Congress. See Civil Rights Act of 1964,
§ 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14). His final report, which called
for federal action to eliminate the pervasive problem of age discrimination in the work-
place, dispelled any doubt Congress might previously have harbored regarding the plight
of older workers. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Older American Worker-Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment-Report of the Secretary of Labor to the Congress Under Section
715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Research Materials 67-69 (1965).
47. President Johnson, in his Older American Message to Congress of January 23,
1967, in which he recommended passage of the ADEA, characterized the magnitude of
the problem:
Hundreds of thousands not yet old, not yet voluntarily retired, find themselves
jobless because of arbitrary age discrimination. . .. [Tihere has been a persis-
tent average of 850,000 people age 45 and over who are unemployed....
Opportunity must be opened to the many Americans over 45 who are quali-
fied and willing to work. We must end arbitrary age limits on hiring.
113 Cong. Rec. 34,743-44 (1967); see also S. Rep. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1967)
(remarks of Sen. Javits) (discussing his misgivings about prior federal failure to enact
legislation to protect older workers).
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982). The ADEA represents a comprehensive attack
against ageism in virtually all aspects of employment. Its proscriptions apply to private
and government employers, employment agencies and labor organizations. The Act pro-
hibits both the failure or refusal to hire, and the discharge of any individual because of his
age. See id. § 623(a)(1). It interdicts age discrimination with respect to an individual's
"compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." Id. The classification
of employees on the basis of age in order to deprive them of employment opportunities or
to adversely affect their status as employees is also made illegal under the Act. See id.
§ 623(2).
49. The express purposes of the ADEA are "to promote employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employ-
ment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from
the impact of age on employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982).
50. See id.
51. Terminating the then-common employer practice of "setting arbitrary age limits
regardless of potential for job performance" was a major impetus for passage of the Act.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602, reprinted in
1967 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 658; see also Adams v. James, 526 F. Supp. 80, 83
(M.D. Ala. 1981) (ADEA was enacted to abolish employer practice of disadvantaging
older employees by establishing age limits without regard to individual ability).
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nation, however, Congress apparently recognized that in certain limited
situations differentials predicated on age or age-related criteria might be
necessary. Consequently, the ADEA sanctions the use of age-based cri-
teria where age is a bona fide occupational qualification."s The legislative
history, however, provides scant guidance for courts construing the
BFOQ exception, 3 and has engendered considerable confusion concern-
ing its interpretation.54
In 1978, Congress amended the ADEA. s5 The amendments, which
reaffirm Congress' mandate that employment decisions be based on indi-
52. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1982).
The ADEA's BFOQ exception closely parallels the BFOQ defense under Title VII.
The major difference between the two exceptions is the substitution of the words "reli-
gion, sex, or national origin" in the latter for the word "age" in the former. Compare 29
U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1982) (ADEA version) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982) (Title VII
version). The similarities between Title VII and the ADEA are purposeful. Title VII
was the model for the ADEA and many of the ADEA's provisions were "derived in haec
verba" from it. Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978); see also Note, supra
note 30, at 396 n.49 (same). Although interpretations of Title VII are relevant in con-
struing the ADEA, see id., their applicability is somewhat limited because Title VII cases
rarely involve public safety concerns while ADEA cases invariably do.
53. See James & Alaimo, BFOQ: An Exception Becoming the Rule, 26 Clev. St. L.
Rev. 1, 9 (1977).
54. Congress neglected to explain why the BFOQ exception was included in the Act.
One reason for its inclusion may be that the ADEA is essentially an extension of the
remedial course initially charted by Congress in Title VII. See H.R. Rep. No. 805, 90th
Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1967 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2213, 2214;
Note, EEOC v. City of Janesville: Promoting Age Discrimination-The Exception Be-
comes The Rule, 14 J. Marshall L. Rev. 895, 897 n. 11 (1981). When viewed as such, it
explains the almost verbatim carrying-over into the ADEA of Title VII's BFOQ lan-
guage. There were no direct references to the exception in the reports that accompanied
either the Senate, Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, ADEA of 1967, S. Rep. No. 723,
90th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1967), or the House, Comm. on Education and Labor, ADEA of
1967, H.R. Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1967), versions of the Act. See 2 H.
Eglit, Age Discrimination, 16-61 (1988). Virtually the only reference to the exception
was made during the Senate floor debates. See 113 Cong. Rec. 31,253 (1967) (remarks of
Sen. Yarborough) (offering the job of pilot as an example of when age might be a BFOQ).
55. Congress was motivated by a need to "insure that older individuals who desire to
work w[ould] not be denied employment opportunities solely on the basis of age." S.
Rep. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
504, 504.
Recognizing that a mandatory retirement age of 65 was unfair in its implicit, stere-
otypical assumption that workers over that age could not be productive and useful, Con-
gress raised the mandatory retirement age from 65 to 70. See id. It also commissioned a
study on whether the upper age limit should be raised above 70. See id. at 514. Realiza-
tion that age 65 did not indicate automatic infirmity was based on the results of several
studies which observed that in general, employees do not become unproductive at any
particular age; that chronological age alone is a poor predictor of functional ability; and
that many older individuals may, by virtue of their experience, actually be better employ-
ees than their younger counterparts. See id. at 505-06. Several cases are in accord with
this last proposition. See Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 515 F. Supp. 1287, 1298 (D.
Md. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 731 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 472 U.S. 353
(1985); Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453, 459 (E.D. Ark. 1976); EEOC v. City of St.
Paul, 500 F. Supp. 1135, 1145 (D. Minn. 1980), afid, 671 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1982);
Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561, 564 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 966 (1977).
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vidualized assessments, 56 effected a major substantive change-clarifica-
tion of the BFOQ exception. First, the amendment explained Congress'
position that once an employer establishes that a particular age is a
BFOQ, it can "lawfully require mandatory retirement at that specified
age."'57 In explaining the BFOQ exception, Congress provided an exam-
ple of when a mandatory retirement age might be countenanced. Ac-
cording to Congress, in some "particularly arduous [areas of] law
enforcement activity," an employer might be justified in concluding that
most employees over a given age would be unable to continue to perform
their jobs and that individualized appraisals of employee performance
would be either impossible or impractical.58
In addition to congressional interpretation of the BFOQ exception,
first the Department of Labor ("DOL"),5 9 and later the Equal Employ-
56. See S. Rep. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 504, 506. Congress emphasized that the decision to retire should be "an
individual option" and that where a person is physically and psychologically able to con-
tinue working, he should not be dismissed on the basis of unsupported misconceptions
concerning the degenerative effects of aging on his ability. Id.
57. Id. at 523.
58. Specifically, Congress stated:
For example, in certain types of particularly arduous law enforcement activity,
there may be a factual basis for believing that substantially all employees above
a specified age would be unable to continue to perform safely and efficiently the
duties of their particular jobs, and it may be impossible or impractical to deter-
mine through medical examinations, periodic reviews of current job perform-
ance and other objective tests the employees' capacity or ability to continue to
perform the jobs safely and efficiently.
Id. at 513-14 (emphasis added).
This example of a BFOQ, ostensibly offered to clarify the situation in which a valid
BFOQ might be established, has generated more confusion than clarity. Some courts
have broadly interpreted the example as Congress' blanket approbation of a mandatory
retirement age for all protective service employees. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738
F.2d 35, 40 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Beck v. Borough of Manheim,
505 F. Supp. 923, 926 (E.D. Pa. 1981). This interpretation is inconsistent with the plain
meaning of the language used by Congress. Congress deliberately distinguished between
non-strenuous activity, generally arduous activity, and particularly arduous activity.
Only employees with particularly arduous duties were the focus of the example. See
Note, The BFOQ in Law Enforcement: Guardian of Public Safety or Conduit for Arbi-
trary Discrimination?, 17 Stetson L. Rev. 787, 805 (1988). This interpretation similarly
ignores that Congress stated only that there might be a factual basis for establishing a
valid BFOQ-this does not mean that there will always be one, and in the absence of a
factual basis supported by objective empirical evidence, the exception is unavailable. Fi-
nally, because protective service work encompasses varying degrees of arduousness, em-
ployers must be cognizant of the requirements and rigors of individual jobs when
invoking the BFOQ exception, otherwise it will be so broadly applied that it will engulf
the rule in contravention of authority requiring a narrow interpretation of the exception.
See generally Note, The Scope of the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Exemption
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: EEOC v. City of Janesville, 57 Chi.[-
]Kent L. Rev. 1145 (1981); Note, supra note 54.
59. Enforcement of the ADEA was originally the provence of the Department of
Labor. See 29 U.S.C. § 625 (1975).
The primary relevance of the DOL's interpretations is the discussion of differentiations
based on reasonable factors other than age, see 29 C.F.R. §§ 860.103-104 (1976), not the
explanation of the BFOQ defense. See id. § 860.102. The DOL specifically contemplated
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ment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), 60 were authorized to issue
guidelines and regulations to aid in administering the Act.6 1 Although
these interpretations lack the force of law,6 2 they are nevertheless "enti-
tled to considerable weight.",
63
Both the DOL6' and the EEOC65 interpretations assert that the BFOQ
defense is to be "narrowly construed" and is to "have limited scope and
application.' ' 66 The agencies also specify that whether a given qualifica-
that physical fitness requirements, based on periodic physical screenings, might constitute
a legitimate foundation for treating employees differently if the requirements were "rea-
sonably necessary for the specific work to be performed" and if they were applied equally
to all employees, regardless of age. Id. § 860.103(f)(1)(i).
According to the DOL:
[A] differentiation based on a physical examination, but not one based on age,
may be recognized as reasonable in certain job situations which necessitate
stringent physical requirements due to inherent occupational factors such as the
safety of the individual employees or of other persons in their charge, or those
occupations which by nature are particularly hazardous.
Id. § 860.103(f)(1)(ii).
The DOL, however, instituted a caveat. It warned that a claim for differentiation
would not be approved when based solely on the employer's subjective assumptions that
all employees over a certain age generally become unable to discharge the duties of the
job in question. See id. § 860.103(f)(1)(iii). Rather, the employer had to provide a fac-
tual justification for treating employees dissimilarly. Thus, an employer claiming that
physical fitness was essential to the normal operation of its business was not relegated
solely to the BFOQ exception-any employee, regardless of his membership in the
ADEA's protected class, could be dismissed for failure to meet the employer's physical
requirements. The only limitation, however, was on the employer's ability to arbitrarily
enforce these requirements.
60. In 1978, enforcement responsibility was transferred to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. See Reorganization Plan No. I of 1978, 92 Stat. 3781, 43 Fed.
Reg. 19,807 (May 9, 1978). The EEOC undertook an extensive review of all of the inter-
pretations previously issued by the Department of Labor and subsequently issued its own
interpretations, which were effective September 29, 1981. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625 (1988).
Although the EEOC's interpretations effectively rescinded the DOL's prior ones, see 46
Fed. Reg. 47724 (1981), there are several substantive similarities. See infra notes 64-68
and accompanying text.
61. See H.R. Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 6, reprinted in 1967 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 2213, 2219.
62. See 2 H. Eglit, supra note 54, at 16-9.
63. Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 748 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 992 (1983); accord Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971);
Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 745 F.2d 988, 993 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1027 (1985).
64. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.1 (1976).
65. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (1988).
66. 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(b) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(a) (1988). The Supreme Court
has adopted this interpretation. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400,
412 (1985).
The DOL furnished limited illustrations of situations where age might be a BFOQ. See
29 C.F.R. § 860.102(c)-(e) (1976). It primarily referred to situations where the federal
government had already established compulsory age limitations for public safety pur-
poses, such as the FAA's "age sixty rule," codified at 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1988),
which mandatorily retires commercial airline pilots at age 60. See Aman v. FAA, 856
F.2d 946, 947-48 (7th Cir. 1988). Note, however, that along with its policy of mandatory
retirement for commercial airline pilots, the FAA has implemented elaborate testing pro-
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tion is a BFOQ is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.6 7
The EEOC's clarifications of the BFOQ exception are important be-
cause they substantively parallel the Tamiami/Criswell standard.68 The
EEOC's interpretation, however, contains a stipulation that limits the
broad discretion accorded employers under Tamiami6 9 by requiring the
employer to prove that mandatory retirement actually furthers its inter-
est in promoting public safety and that no equally effective, but less dis-
criminatory alternatives are available. 7' This qualification, however, was
cedures which annually examine pilots for health problems. See EEOC v. Boeing Co.,
843 F.2d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 222 (1988).
Conversely, the EEOC refrained from offering any examples, fearing that even general
examples would be viewed as having "received the imprimatur of the Commission." 46
Fed. Reg. 47,725 (1981).
67. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(b) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(a) (1988). The Supreme
Court is also in accord with this interpretation. See Criswell, 472 U.S. at 411.
A major problem in interpreting what is reasonably necessary to the essence of a pro-
tective service employer's business is the fact that the nature of this employment cannot
be characterized uniformly. Certain areas of protective service work are irrefutably haz-
ardous and physically demanding. The degree of peril and physical strain of any particu-
lar area, however, depends on several factors. An important factor is the actual work
performed. See generally EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 500 F. Supp. 1135, 1138 (D. Minn.
1980) (firefighting, for example, is "the most hazardous of all civilian occupations in
terms of both job-related injuries and deaths"), aff'd, 671 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1982).
Other factors include geographic and demographic factors, particularly population of the
region in which the employer operates, see generally Kossman v. Calumet County, 600 F.
Supp. 175, 177 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (law enforcement operations in heavily populated metro-
politan areas are more dangerous and arduous than in rural, less populated areas), rev'd
in part, vacated in part, 800 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 (1987);
Note, Age Discrimination and Police Employment Practices, 4 Hofstra Lab. L.J. 153, 153
n.3 (1986) ("a police officer working in New York City will be subject to more high
pressure situations which require quick thinking and strenuous activity, than will a police
officer working in a small, rural, Mid-West town"), and the number of employees on the
force, see generally EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447, 456 (8th Cir.
1984) (on large forces, less senior employees usually hold more risky and physically chal-
lenging positions while higher ranking officers are more likely to occupy supervisory and
administrative positions), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1985); EEOC v. City of Minneapo-
lis, 537 F. Supp. 750, 752-53, 757 (D. Minn. 1982) (same); Retirement Policies, supra note
11, at 171-72 (same).
68. The interpretation states:
An employer asserting a BFOQ defense has the burden of proving that (1) the
age limit is reasonably necessary to the essence of the business, and either (2)
that all or substantially all individuals excluded from the job involved are in fact
disqualified, or (3) that some of the individuals so excluded possess a disqualify-
ing trait that cannot be ascertained except by reference to age.
29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(b) (1988). This interpretation was issued after the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (1976), but before the
Supreme Court's decision in Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
69. 531 F.2d at 236 n.30 ("We believe that courts must afford employers substan-
tial-though not absolute-discretion in selecting specific safety standards and in judging
their reasonableness.").
70. The interpretation provides:
If the employer's objective in asserting a BFOQ is the goal of public safety, the
employer must prove that the challenged practice does indeed effectuate that
goal and that there is no acceptable alternative which would better advance it or
equally advance it with less discriminatory impact.
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not expressly adopted by the Supreme Court in Western Air Lines, Inc. v.
Criswell.71
Thus, the ADEA, with certain limited exceptions, expresses Congress'
intent to eradicate arbitrary age discrimination in employment. Because
the BFOQ exception was intended to be narrowly construed,72 however,
courts must interpret the defense in a manner consistent with the
ADEA's primary objective of encouraging individualized, age-neutral
employment decisions. In refusing to require that protective service em-
ployers implement minimum physical standards, courts have broadened
the scope of the BFOQ exception by ignoring the emphasis placed by
Congress and the administrative agencies on individual ability and
testing.
The failure to require the use of minimum physical standards is flawed
for essentially three reasons. First, generic assumptions about age and
ability directly conflict with Congress' recognition that "chronological
age alone is a poor indicator of ability to perform a job,"73 and its belief
in the basic civil right of people to be judged according to their ability "to
perform a job rather than on the basis of stereotypes about race, sex, or
age." 7
4
Second, both Congress, in its 1978 clarification of the BFOQ excep-
tion,"7 and the DOL, in its interpretive bulletin,71 specifically contem-
plated the use, by employers, of objective medical examinations and
other age-neutral techniques to assess employee job performance.77
Although Congress sanctioned the use of age as a proxy in limited cir-
cumstances,78 many employers have ignored this directive by failing to
29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(b) (1988).
71. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
Although agency interpretations of an act are persuasive authority, courts are not re-
quired to defer to them. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). In Criswell, the
Supreme Court neither formally adopted nor repudiated this part of the EEOC's interpre-
tations when it enunciated the proper standard under the BFOQ exception. Although
one commentator has suggested that it was not adopted, see 2 H. Eglit, supra note 54, at
16-64, an argument that it was tacitly incorporated can be advanced. First, the EEOC
did not rescind this section of the interpretation following Criswell. Second, the Criswell
Court, in a footnote, acknowledged the existence of this particular qualification when it
cited the text of 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(b). See Criswell, 472 U.S. at 416 n.24.
72. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
73. S. Rep. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 504, 505.
74. Id. at 506.
75. See id. at 514.
76. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
77. Only where certain employees, because of their age, can no longer be accurately
tested does their retention threaten to undermine the employer's commitment to the
health and fitness of employees. See infra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
78. According to Congress, mandatory retirement plans are permissible only where
medical and other age-neutral tests are fallible in detecting traits in older employees that
could preclude them from continuing to perform effectively. Note also that Congress'
revelation that the use of objective physical testing might be impossible or impractical
was made within the context of a reference only to "certain types of particularly arduous
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monitor employee health and fitness at any age.7 9
Finally, in the absence of minimum physical standards, mandatory re-
tirement based on a public safety argument violates the EEOC's interpre-
tive guidelines. Merely retiring older employees does little to effectuate
the employer's goal of promoting public safety.8" Furthermore, because
mandatorily retiring capable older workers without producing empirical
evidence regarding their individual ability perpetuates the myth that they
are expendable, minimum physical standards offer a less discriminatory
alternative by circumscribing the employer's ability to discriminate.8
II. THE BFOQ STANDARD AND THE IMPLICIT REQUIREMENT OF
MINIMUM PHYSICAL STANDARDS
The two-pronged standard first enunciated by the Fifth Circuit in
Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.,2 is the product of a merger of sepa-
rate principles derived from two Title VII sex discrimination cases, Diaz
v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 83 and Weeks v. Southern Bell Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co.8" Diaz contributed the first prong of the
Tamiami/Criswell standard, which requires that the employer's asserted
job qualifications be more than just tangentially related or convenient to
the employer's business-they must be "reasonably necessary."85 The
second prong of the standard, which requires empirical data supporting
an alleged correlation between age and ability, is derived from Weeks.86
law enforcement activity," rather than all law enforcement activity. S. Rep. No. 493,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 504, 513.
Although not completely clear, Congress may have been referring to the fact that in
certain areas, particularly firefighting, it is difficult to accurately simulate, without endan-
gering the individual being tested, the physical conditions under which their job is per-
formed. See EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 500 F. Supp. 1135, 1141-42 (D. Minn. 1980),
ajfd, 671 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1982); cf EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748
F.2d 447, 453 (8th Cir. 1984) ("Laboratory tests cannot recreate safely the stressful,
sometimes life-threatening, situations in which the Patrol members work."), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 828 (1985); EEOC v. City of Minneapolis, 537 F. Supp. 750, 755 (D. Minn.
1982) (same for police).
79. See, e.g., Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190, 1198 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985); EEOC v. City of Linton, 623 F. Supp. 724, 725 (S.D. Ind.
1985); City of Minneapolis, 537 F. Supp. at 754.
Other employers fail to test employees beyond a pre-induction physical examination.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Kentucky State Police Dep't, 860 F.2d 665, 667 (6th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 2066 (1989); EEOC v. City of E. Providence, 798 F.2d 524, 528 (1st
Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Missouri, 748 F.2d at 454.
80. In fact, it may actually lure employers and the public into a false sense of security.
See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
82. 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
83. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
84. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
85. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388. In Diaz, the court ascribed a "business necessity test, not a
business convenience test" to the term "reasonably necessary." Id. It held that only
where the "essence" of an employer's business would be undermined by not hiring exclu-
sively one sex would gender-based discrimination be sanctioned. Id.
86. The Weeks court held that in order for an employer to rely on the BFOQ excep-
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Tamiami, an interstate bus company, had refused to hire applicants
over the age of 40 for initial employment as drivers on the ground that
being younger than age 40 was a reasonable and necessary qualification
for the position.87 The central issue was whether this age limit was rea-
sonably necessary to the essence of Tamiami's business, given the consid-
erable public safety implications involved. Specifically, the court
considered whether the Weeks prong of the BFOQ test, which required
Tamiami to empirically support its belief that the exclusion of applicants
over the age of 40 was reasonably necessary to the essence of its business,
tion, it must prove "that [it] had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for
believing, that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and effi-
ciently the duties of the job involved." Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235.
Alternatively, the court noted in dictum that in certain circumstances an employer
might be able to attribute the general characteristics of a group to particular members by
showing that it was impossible or impractical to individually assess them. Id. at 235 n.5.
This alternative, the Weeks "footnote 5" exception, is the second part of the second prong
of the Tamiami/Criswell standard.
It was predicated on a district court decision, Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F.
Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967), afjrd in part, rev'd in part 416 F.2d 711 (1969). Bowe's female
plaintiffs had sued under Title VII, arguing that Colgate's plant seniority system pur-
posely discriminated against women, thereby denying them various job opportunities
within the plant. The system permitted men to bid for any job within the plant but
precluded women from bidding on any job which involved the lifting of more than thirty-
five pounds. See Bowe, 416 F.2d at 715. The district court held that the system did not
violate Title VII because it was predicated on a protectionist state law which set weight-
lifting restrictions for women. See id. at 715-16.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit rejected the district court's broad construction of the
BFOQ defense and held that the system violated Title VII's mandate that individual
qualifications rather than "broad class stereotypes" should be considered. Id. at 717.
The court allowed Colgate to retain the weight lifting limit as a general guideline pro-
vided, however, that it afforded each employee "a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate
his or her ability to perform more strenuous jobs on a regular basis," with successful
demonstration of ability ensuring the opportunity to bid on any position their seniority
entitled them to. Id. at 718 (emphasis added).
The Weeks "footnote 5" exception was adopted by Tamiami before Bowe was appealed
to the Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit's approach, however, is more consonant with
the remedial purposes of Title VII and the ADEA than the Weeks "footnote 5" excep-
tion. Although it permits the use of sex as a general proxy, it gives each employee who
wishes an individualized opportunity to rebut the presumption that they are incapable
solely because of their membership in a given class.
87. Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 228 (5th Cir. 1976). Tamiami
had argued that its entry level age limit was reasonably necessary to guarantee the safety
of its passengers. First, it presented evidence concerning the physical and mental rigors
of its "extra board" work assignment system. Id. at 231. Pursuant to an industry-wide
policy, Tamiami's operation was divided into two work categories: the regular run which
was available to drivers with seniority and the extra-board to which drivers with low
seniority, particularly new hires, were assigned. See id. Extra-board drivers are on call
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week and must be prepared to drive anywhere
within the continental United States at any time. See id. The extra-board is thus more
physically and mentally demanding than regular runs. Tamiami's medical experts had
testified that aging is accompanied by physiological changes which affect an individual's
ability to drive safely and that there are no medical tests which can effectively separate
chronological from functional age for bus drivers. See id. at 237-38. This combined evi-
dence satisfied Tamiami's burden of proving that it was impossible to screen out unquali-
fied applicants absent an entry level age limitation. See id. at 238.
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should be modified to accommodate the public safety factor or elimi-
nated altogether,88 as the Seventh Circuit had done in an earlier bus car-
rier case, Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. 89 Rather than merging
Weeks and Diaz,9" the Greyhound court opted for a rational basis stan-
dard of proof in lieu of requiring empirical evidence by substituting an-
other Title VII case, Spurlock v. United Airlines,9 for the Weeks
component.
92
The Fifth Circuit, however, eschewed Greyhound's rational basis stan-
dard and instead relied on the Weeks-Diaz combination. In upholding
Tamiami's maximum hiring age as a BFOQ, it ruled that Greyhound had
misinterpreted the standard established by these two cases. Diaz is not
88. See id. at 234-35.
89. 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). In Greyhound,
the Seventh Circuit upheld a similar age limitation as a BFOQ. Greyhound, also an
interstate bus carrier, had argued that its maximum hiring age of 35 for drivers was
reasonably necessary to guarantee the safety of its passengers. Like Tamiami, it
presented evidence concerning the physical and mental rigors of its extra-board work
assignment system, see supra note 87 and accompanying text, and argued that this, com-
bined with the degenerative and medically undetectable physiological changes that begin
to occur around age 35, would have a magnified negative effect on older hires' driving
skills. See id. at 863. It also argued that although it could initially screen applicants for
health defects, regular scrutiny of the continued health and fitness of drivers was not
feasible. See id. at 864.
90. In Greyhound, the Seventh Circuit refused to merge Weeks and Diaz on the
ground that Weeks imposed an improperly stringent burden of proof because it did not
involve public safety considerations. See id. at 861. Greyhound was distinguished from
Weeks because the safety element in the former encompassed both Greyhound's passen-
gers and the motoring public, while the latter involved only concern for the individual job
applicant. Diaz was deemed more appropriate to accommodate the risk to public safety
because the essence of Pan Am's business was identical to the essence of Greyhound's-
the safe transportation of large numbers of passengers. See id. at 862.
91. 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972). In Spurlock, an early Title VII case, a black appli-
cant for the position of flight officer challenged United's requirement that applicants have
a college degree and a minimum of 500 hours of flight experience. In holding that these
criteria were job related, the court stated "when the job clearly requires a high degree of
skill and the economic and human risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant are
great, the employer bears a correspondingly lighter burden to show that his employment
criteria are job-related." Id. at 219.
92. Adopting the Diaz standard of proof, the court held that Greyhound could sus-
tain its burden by establishing that its operations would be endangered if the entry-level
age limitation were eliminated. See Greyhound, 499 F.2d at 862. The Seventh Circuit
continued its analysis, however, ultimately adopting a rational basis standard of proof.
See id. at 863. Relying on dictum in Spurlock, the court stressed that the substantial risks
to public safety of Greyhound's hiring an unqualified applicant significantly reduced its
burden of proving the necessity of its employment criteria. See Greyhound, 499 F.2d at
862-63. Instead of requiring Greyhound to prove that most applicants over age 40 could
not perform safely, it held that Greyhound had to provide only a rational basis for believ-
ing that the risk of harm to its passengers would increase were it forced to eliminate the
age limit. See id. at 863.
In upholding the age restriction, the court also noted that Greyhound had exercised "a
good faith judgment" in promulgating the hiring policy and that it was "not the result of
an arbitrary belief lacking in objective reason or rationale." Id. at 865. But see Orzel v.
City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 752 (7th Cir.) (good faith belief by defend-
ant is insufficient under ADEA), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983).
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an exception to Weeks to be substituted in order to accommodate the
presence of a compelling public safety factor; rather, the two cases repre-
sent separate elements of one unified standard.93 As a basic threshold,
the Diaz (first) prong requires that the job qualifications asserted by the
employer be reasonably necessary to the essence of its business. When
the essence of the employer's business implicates public safety, however,
the Diaz prong incorporates the safety factor because the stringency of
the employer's job qualifications may be increased in proportion to the
safety factor as measured by "the likelihood of harm and ... [its] prob-
able severity ... in [the event] of an accident.""4 Employer discretion in
selecting job qualifications is substantial,95 but not unlimited-they must
be designed to, and must in fact, promote public safety.96
Once the reasonable necessity requirement under the first prong is met,
the job qualifications must then satisfy the Weeks or second prong.97 By
phrasing the second prong disjunctively, however, the court ameliorated
the employer's burden of proving, to a relative certainty, the inability of
an entire class of employees to perform the duties of the job involved.98
Tamiami and related transportation cases are the paradigmatic public
safety cases, involving the potential for major disaster in the event a com-
mercial bus driver or airline pilot becomes incapacitated on the job. The
potential risks to third party safety present in Tamiami, however, are of
such magnitude that it may be inappropriate to blindly apply the result
reached by the Fifth Circuit to all cases implicating public safety, partic-
ularly protective service employment. Although Tamiami establishes the
definitive standard for evaluating BFOQ claims, those applying its stan-
dard must remain cognizant of the particular facts which were
involved. 99
Analysis of Tamiami reveals that courts rejecting the necessity of min-
imum physical standards under the first prong of the Tamiami/Criswell
93. See Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 235 n.27.
94. Id. at 236.
95. See id. at 236 n.30.
96. See id. at 236.
According to the Supreme Court, where third party safety is implicated, Weeks ex-
pressly conditions the reasonable necessity of a given job qualification on its furthering
the employer's interest in public safety. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S.
400, 413 (1985).
97. See Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 236.
98. The incorporation of the Weeks "footnote 5" exception into the BFOQ test is
cause for concern. One reason is the Fifth Circuit's failure to explain what grounds could
constitute the impossibility of reliably differentiating qualified from unqualified individu-
als. Additionally, the rationale underlying the Weeks "footnote 5" exception was rejected
when Bowe was appealed to the Seventh Circuit. See supra note 86 and accompanying
text. Perhaps a more preferable alternative to the automatic mandatory retirement of
protective service employees would be to provide those employees who wish to continue
working an opportunity to prove their continued fitness for the job. By establishing a
rebuttable presumption, the loophole under the second prong of the Tamiami/Criswell
standard would be substantially narrowed.
99. See Criswell, 472 U.S. at 422.
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standard have overlooked a fact critical to the Fifth Circuit's conclusion
under that prong of the test-Tamiami annually subjected all drivers to a
thorough physical examination."° Tamiami's strong commitment to the
health of its drivers contributed significantly to its satisfying the burden
of proving that a maximum hiring age, used as a proxy for driver health
and fitness, was reasonably necessary to its ability to transport passengers
safely. 101
The third party safety factors implicated in Tamiami were significant,
further contributing to satisfaction of the first prong of the BFOQ test.
This same safety risk, however, does not necessarily exist when protec-
tive service employees are involved.° 2 Rather, the nature of the risk var-
ies according to the job performed. 1 3 In dictum, the Tamiami court
recognized the potential for abuse of the particular factual situation in-
volved when it warned that employers would have to "show a reasonable
basis for [their] assessment of risk of injury/death."" Tamiami thus
emphasizes that absent a verified danger to a number of lives, bare asser-
tions of public safety are not necessarily enough to justify mandatory
retirement schemes. Many protective service employers have failed to
comply with this requirement, however, instead ascribing uniform im-
portance to all areas of protective service employment in order to vindi-
cate their abrogation of ADEA principles through the BFOQ
exception. 105
100. See Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 233.
The Department of Transportation's regulations prescribed a bi-annual physical exam-
ination for inter-city bus drivers. See id. Tamiami's concern for the physical fitness of its
drivers was stronger. In addition to a complete pre-hiring physical examination, it con-
tinued to evaluate each driver on, at minimum, an annual basis. See id.
101. See id. at 236.
102. See Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 596 F. Supp. 939, 953 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 770
F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1985); EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 526 F. Supp. 1135, 1141 (C.D.
Cal. 1981), ajfd, 706 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984);
Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453, 462 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
103. A state trooper who has a heart attack while driving, for example, poses a signifi-
cant hazard to other motorists. In other instances, however, the real danger may be to
the officer himself and no one else. See EEOC v. Mississippi, 654 F. Supp. 1168, 1182
(S.D. Miss. 1987), affd, 837 F.2d 1398 (5th Cir. 1988).
104. Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 238 (5th Cir. 1976). Accord-
ing to the Fifth Circuit, "[p]riceless as is a single life in our concept of the value of human
life and our undoubted unwillingness ever to approve a practice which might kill one but
not, say, twenty, we think the safety factor should be evaluated in terms of the possibility
or likelihood of injury/death." Id.
The Greyhound court took a different position: "Greyhound need only demonstrate
however a minimal increase in risk of harm for it is enough to show that elimination of
the hiring policy might jeopardize the life of one more person than might otherwise occur
under the present hiring practice." Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859,
863 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
105. Specifically, some employers and courts have likened protective service depart-
ments to "paramilitary" organizations. See, e.g., EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Pa-
trol, 748 F.2d 447, 457 (8th Cir. 1984); Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35, 39 (1st Cir.
1984); EEOC v. New Jersey, 631 F. Supp. 1506, 1509 (D.N.J. 1986); EEOC v. Penn-
sylvania, 596 F. Supp. 1333, 1344 (M.D. Pa. 1984). Under such a characterization, an
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Because the risks to public safety are so significant when a common
carrier is involved, the Fifth Circuit properly required a relatively high
degree of reliability in the medical tests used to diagnose traits which
could adversely affect a driver's ability and thus endanger passengers.10 6
Employers undoubtedly should "err on the side of caution" whenever
human life is involved. 11 7  The safety risks facing common carriers and
protective service employers are, however, extremely incongruous. As a
result, protective service employers have been overly cautious in demand-
ing virtual precision in techniques to detect the presence of physiological
ailments in older officers, particularly coronary artery disease
("CAD").10 8
The medical tests in Tamiami were used to detect age-related impair-
ments in relatively young individuals before they were hired. The physi-
ological changes precluding safe driving are relatively subtle before age
40, however, making detection difficult and contributing to the inefficacy
of the tests. In a mandatory retirement context, conversely, medical and
physical fitness tests are much more useful in identifying older individu-
als who have retained their physical vitality.'09 By rejecting the predic-
tive capability of diagnostic techniques at any age, protective service
employers have imposed an inappropriate standard of accuracy in order
to shoehorn themselves into the Weeks "footnote 5" exception, and to
justify their failure to implement minimum physical standards.
Additionally, the disjunctive phrasing of the second prong of the
Tamiami/Criswell standard makes a proper inquiry under the first prong
essential.' 10 Otherwise, there is a loophole for employers who cannot
empirically validate their subjective belief that all or most employees over
a certain age lack the ability to perform the job in question. Most em-
ployers have relied on the second facet of the second prong, arguing that
employee is mandatorily retired upon reaching a designated age, regardless of the actualjob he performs and irrespective of the requirements and dangers of his particular posi-
tion. Thus, an employee who holds a desk job could be mandatorily retired because he is
presumed to be too old to perform the rigors of field work, regardless of the fact that the
probability of being called to physically active duty is minimal. The employee is deemed
to pose a risk to third party safety solely because he is a protective service employee. This
view, however, ignores the fact that the risk of third party injury or death may be mini-
mal or non-existent in the event this particular individual cannot perform his job. But see
EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 500 F. Supp. 1135, 1145 (D. Minn. 1980), (recognizing that
risks to public safety differ with employee rank), afld, 671 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1982);
Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. at 456-57 (same).
106. See Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 238.
107. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 419 (1985); see also Beck v.
Borough of Manheim, 505 F. Supp. 923, 926 (E.D. Pa. 1981) ("considerations of public
safety merit paramount concern").
108. See infra notes 183-186 and accompanying text.
109. See Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190, 1198 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1027 (1985); EEOC v. City of Minneapolis, 537 F. Supp. 750, 755 (D. Minn.
1982); EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 526 F. Supp. 1135, 1139 (C.D. Cal. 1981), af'd,
706 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
110. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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it is impossible to screen employees effectively to detect the presence of
asymptomatic CAD."1 Unfortunately, this focus relieves the employer
of its burden of proving that a substantial portion of the individuals over
the mandatory retirement age actually possess CAD, and deprives an
individual of the opportunity to rebut the presumption that he does pos-
sess the trait in question. 112 Moreover, the absence of minimum physical
standards virtually eliminates the employer's burden under the first part
of the Weeks prong because the employer can subjectively attribute cer-
tain traits precluding safe and efficient performance to older employees,
without ever establishing that younger employees do not possess them."13
This result frustrates the ADEA's preference for employment determina-
tions based on empirical evidence garnered from individualized
determinations. 14
III. THE CONTROVERSY ANALYZED AND CRITICIZED
A. The Flawed View Against Minimum Physical Standards
Many jurisdictions statutorily retire protective service workers." 5 The
existence of these statutes reflects a generalized presumption that by a
certain age, physical degeneration has taken its toll on an employee's
physical ability. Protective service employers assert that because the cor-
relation between chronological age and diminished ability is normative, it
provides a factual basis for believing that all or most persons over a statu-
tory retirement age will be unable to perform safely and efficiently the
rigors of their job, thus threatening the safe and efficient operation of
their business." 16
111. See infra notes 182-213 and accompanying text.
112. The availability and accuracy of testing methods is essentially reduced to a battle
of conflicting expert testimony under the second prong, with the more persuasive testi-
mony prevailing. See Hoefelman v. Conservation Comm'n, 718 F.2d 281, 285 (8th Cir.
1983); Note, Public Safety Employers' Diminishing BFOQ Burden in Age Discrimination
Cases-EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 18 Creighton L. Rev. 1211, 1228, 1236
(1985).
113. Unfortunately, an employee's youth does not guarantee his ability to perform the
rigors of his job. See Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453, 459 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
114. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 422 (1985); Davis, 414 F.
Supp. at 461.
115. See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code § 20980 (West Supp. 1989); id. § 50870 (1983); Del.
Code. Ann., tit. 11, § 8323 (1987); Miss. Code. Ann. § 49-1-15 (Supp. 1988); Tenn. Code
Ann. §§ 8-35-205 (1988). For a comprehensive list, see EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S.
226, 253 n.2 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
116. See, e.g., EEOC v. University of Texas Health Science Center, 710 F.2d 1091,
1094 (5th Cir. 1983); Popkins v. Zagel, 611 F. Supp. 809, 812 (C.D. Ill. 1985); EEOC v.
City of Minneapolis, 537 F. Supp. 750, 754-55 (D. Minn. 1982).
Employers routinely argue that most individuals over the age of 55 lack the aerobic
capacity required to support the sustained periods of physical activity which are part of
protective service work. See, e.g., EEOC v. New Jersey, 631 F. Supp. 1506, 1510-11
(D.N.J. 1986), af'd, 815 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1987); Popkins, 611 F. Supp. at 812. This,
coupled with other physiological changes including reduced strength and stamina, and
the correlation between age and CAD, is said to lead to the irrebuttable conclusion that
younger individuals are more capable of performing the physical rigors of protective ser-
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These assertions, however, ignore the fact that the aging process affects
each individual differently117 and that chronological age alone is a poor
gauge of functional ability.1 ' In fact, many older protective service of-
ficers have been found to be at least as physically competent as their
younger counterparts.' 19 Moreover, generalizations concerning age and
physical ability ignore the value of on-the-job experience that can be at-
tained only through years of service. Such experience tempers an of-
ficer's judgment1 20 and may offset any diminution in physical ability.2 l
The First 2 and Eighth Circuits"z3 adhere to the view that protective
service employers need not implement minimum physical standards in
order to prove that health and physical fitness are BFOQs reasonably
necessary to the essence of their business. These circuit court conclu-
sions, as well as those in a special concurrence to the Fifth Circuit's opin-
ion in EEOC v. Mississippi State Tax Commission, z124 are representative of
the flawed analyses and erroneous arguments offered to justify the failure
of employers to implement minimum physical standards.
The most egregious analytical error committed by some courts is infus-
ing a rational basis standard into the inquiry under the first prong of the
Tamiami/Criswell standard. 125 In the wake of Tamiami, the rationality
standard applied in Greyhound'26 was largely repudiated, 127 with the
vice work. See generally City of Minneapolis, 537 F. Supp. at 754-55 (chronicling the
degenerative physiological changes that generally accompany aging); Beck v. Borough of
Manheim, 505 F. Supp. 923, 926 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (same); EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 500
F. Supp. 1135, 1140-41 (D. Minn. 1980) (same), affid, 671 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1982).
117. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 409 (1985); City of Minne-
apolis, 537 F. Supp. at 755.
118. See S. Rep. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 504, 505.
119. See, e.g., EEOC v. State Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 660 F. Supp.
1104, 1107 (N.D. Fla. 1986); City of Minneapolis, 537 F. Supp. at 755; EEOC v. County
of Los Angeles, 526 F. Supp. 1135, 1139 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp.
453, 459 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
120. See cases cited supra note 56.
121. See Dep't of Highway Safety, 660 F. Supp. at 1107; Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. at
459.
122. See EEOC v. City of E. Providence, 798 F.2d 524, 531 (1st Cir. 1986).
123. See EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447, 457 (8th Cir. 1984)
(first circuit court decision to explicitly reject requirement that protective service em-
ployers implement minimum physical standards before they can successfully invoke
BFOQ defense), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1985).
124. Also representative is the special concurrence to the Fifth Circuit opinion in
EEOC v. Mississippi State Tax Commission, 848 F.2d 526, 533-36 (5th Cir. 1988) (Jones,
J., specially concurring), vacated and remanded, 873 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1989). Although
the opinion was vacated, Judge Jones' concurrence, which is tantamount to a dissent,
echoes the analyses and arguments of the First and Eighth Circuits.
125. See, e.g., EEOC v. Missouri, 748 F.2d at 450-51; Popkins v. Zagel, 611 F. Supp.
809, 813 (C.D. Ill. 1985); Mahoney v. Trabucco, 574 F. Supp. 955, 958 (D. Mass. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds, 738 F.2d 35 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984).
126. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
127. See Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977); Houghton v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561, 564 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Aaron
v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453, 462 (E.D. Ark. 1976). But see Murnane v. American Air-
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overwhelming majority of courts embracing the Tamiami reasonable ne-
cessity standard.128 Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected the use of a
rational basis standard for safety-related BFOQ claims under the ADEA
in Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell,129 ostensibly precluding further re-
liance on a Greyhound-like rational basis standard. Although a rational
basis standard is analytically inappropriate under the ADEA, it is an
acceptable standard for the purposes of an equal protection clause analy-
sis.13 One of these equal protection cases, Massachusetts Board of Re-
tirement v. Murgia, T" has been impermissibly incorporated into ADEA
analysis, particularly by the Eighth Circuit in EEOC v. Missouri State
Highway Patrol.
1 32
A rational basis standard, in effect, greatly reduces the burden for em-
ployers invoking the BFOQ defense as compared with the Tamiami!
Criswell standard because it requires the employer to demonstrate that
elimination of the job qualification would only minimally increase the
lines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (combining Tamiami and Greyhound), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
128. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 32.
129. 472 U.S. 400 (1985). In Criswell, the Court held that Western's policy of
mandatorily retiring flight engineers at age 60, although reasonable, was not reasonably
necessary to the essence of its business. See id. at 422-23.
130. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retire-
ment v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976) (per curiam).
131. 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam). In Murgia, the Supreme Court held that
mandatory retirement of state police officers at age 50 passed constitutional muster under
the equal protection clause because the classification drawn by the statute was clearly
rationally related to the State's objective of protecting the public by ensuring the physical
fitness of its uniformed state police through the removal of officers who were presump-
tively physically unfit. See id. at 314-15. The Court declined to apply a strict scrutiny
standard to the statute, holding that the right to government employment was not a
fundamental right and that the aged were not a suspect class. See id. at 312-13.
132. 748 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1985). The Eighth Cir-
cuit noted that the highway patrol's age limitations were statutory, reflecting a legislative
determination that such restrictions were in the best interest of both the general public
and the patrol. See id. at 449-50. Although it recognized that the legislature's exercise of
its judgment did not relieve the employer of its burden under the BFOQ test, the court
stated that it would nevertheless "accord some deference to the state legislative declara-
tion." Id. at 450. Curiously, Murgia was cited in support of this proposition. See id.
In a separate part of its analysis, the court again cited Murgia. First, it characterized
the job requirements of a state highway patrolman as physically and mentally arduous
and dangerous. See id. at 451. Based upon the apparent rigors of the job, the court
concluded that the qualifications of physical ability and mental strength were reasonably
necessary to the performance of the Patrol's functions, "and that in these terms there is a
correlation between the mandatory retirement age of sixty and the safe and efficient per-
formance of the Patrol's functions." Id. In support of the last part of its conclusion,
however, it cited Murgia instead of Tamiami. See id. The court stated only that "a
correlation" between age and the proper functioning of the employer's business had been
established. Id. Because it failed to describe the strength of this relationship, however, it
can be argued that by citing to Murgia instead of Tamiami, the Eighth Circuit in fact
impermissibly applied a rational basis standard instead of the required reasonable neces-
sity standard. See Note, supra note 112, at 1241.
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probability of harm.133 It also leaves employer discretion in establishing
job qualifications virtually unfettered-once the employer uses the buzz-
words "public safety," the rational basis standard effectively immunizes
the job requirements from judicial scrutiny because the employer must
only show a good faith belief that its qualification will advance public
safety interests. 34
Under the Tamiami/Criswell standard, by contrast, the employer must
establish a stronger correlation between the job qualification asserted and
the third party safety factor-it must be reasonably necessary to the pro-
motion of public safety-and the employer must prove that the asserted
qualification does indeed further its overriding interest in public safety. 135
The danger of reviewing legislation under a deferential rational basis
standard is substantial because unless the challenged legislation is wholly
arbitrary or capricious, it is "always upheld."' 136 Because the analysis
under the ADEA represents a strict departure from the deferential ra-
tional basis standard of Murgia,137 a court's reliance on it for the purpose
of an ADEA analysis is clearly erroneous.
Furthermore, minimum physical standards were actually present in
Murgia.'38 In fact, the Court considered whether the state's refusal to
continue to assess officers after age 50, instead of mandatorily retiring
them, undermined the rationality of the retirement scheme, and held that
it did not.' 39 In a footnote, the Court emphasized that individualized
physical examinations strengthened the rationality of the mandatory re-
tirement strategy by eliminating any younger officer who was not as
133. See Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 862-63 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
134. See Note, supra note 18, at 1385 ("The [Greyhound] court's flat assertion of the
Spurlock rule effectively cuts off inquiry into the motivation of the employer for setting
up his allegedly discriminatory age policy.").
135. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413 (1985).
136. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976) (per
curiam) (Marshall, J., dissenting); accord Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S.
400, 421-23 (1985); Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1978).
137. See e.g., Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 749 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983); Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 675 F.2d 842, 845-46 (6th Cir.
1982); EEOC v. County of Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d 373, 376 n.8 (9th Cir. 1982).
138. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 311. All officers under age 50 were given physical exami-
nations while those under the age of 40 were tested biannually. See id. Those between
the ages of 40 and 50 were subjected to a more rigorous annual physical examination,
including an electrocardiogram. See id.
139. See id. at 311-12. When officers were mandatorily retired at age 50, they were
still in excellent physical and mental condition. See id. Consequently, the appellant ar-
gued that it was irrational to retire officers at the age of 50 when their health and fitness
were already being monitored through annual physical examinations. See id.
Although the Court conceded that less discriminatory alternatives to mandatory retire-
ment might be available, it noted that where rationality is the standard, neither the draw-
ing of perfect classifications nor the use of the best method of differentiation is required.
See id. at 316; cf 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(b) (1988) ("If the employer's objective in asserting a
BFOQ [under the ADEA] is the goal of public safety, the employer must prove that...
there is no acceptable alternative which would better advance it or equally advance it
with less discriminatory impact.").
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physically qualified as the 50-year-old officers who had, up until their
mandatory retirement, demonstrated their own physical ability through
the tests. 140
If the presence of physical testing for all employees "augments [the]
rationality"'' 41 of a mandatory retirement policy, an argument can be
made that afortiori, physical evaluations or standards must be present in
order to validate mandatory retirement policies under the more stringent
reasonable necessity standard. The presence of minimum physical stan-
dards and testing can be viewed as elevating the rationality of mandatory
retirement under Murgia to the level of reasonable necessity required by
the Tamiami/Criswell standard.
Courts that have incorrectly applied a Murgia-like rational basis stan-
dard under the first prong of the Tamiami/Criswell standard have also
erred in their analysis under the second prong.142 By employing a mere
rationality test, these courts have permitted employers to fall short of
sustaining their burden of establishing reasonable necessity under the
first prong. Consequently, the judicial conclusions under the second
prong are void because these courts should never have reached that stage
of the analysis.
A second argument influencing courts and advanced by employers is
grounded in principles of federalism. Congress has mandated retirement
at age 55 for all federal firefighters and law enforcement personnel. "'
Consequently, some courts and employers have reasoned that if Congress
can statutorily retire these federal employees in order to promote a
youthful corps of employees, the judgment of state legislatures should be
accorded similar deference." 4
This view was rendered inappropriate, however, when the Supreme
140. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 316 n.10.
141. Id.
142. Following its suspect reliance on Murgia, the Eighth Circuit, for example, turned
to the second prong, focusing on the degenerative physiological changes that accompany
aging and emphasizing the diminished aerobic capacity and elevated incidence of coro-
nary artery disease in older individuals. -See EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol,
748 F.2d 447, 451-53 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1985). It found that
because there was no effective way to distinguish between physically qualified and un-
qualified patrolmen over the age of 60, age-based distinctions in lieu of age-neutral physi-
cal screenings to monitor the continued health and fitness of employees were required.
See id. at 453-54. Contra EEOC v. New Jersey, 631 F. Supp. 1506, 1508, 1511 (D.N.J.
1986) (New Jersey state police have a comprehensive fitness and health screening pro-
gram for all officers, despite alleged inefficacy of certain medical tests, including those to
assess the presence of asymptomatic CAD), aft'd, 815 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1987).
143. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., EEOC v. Missouri, 748 F.2d at 455-56 (court noted in dictum that it was
influenced by presence of mandatory retirement policy for federal law enforcement per-
sonnel); Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 731 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that statu-
tory requirement that federal fire-fighters retire at age 55 establishes, as a matter of law,
that age 55 constitutes a BFOQ for state and local firefighters), rev'd, 472 U.S. 353 (1985);
Retirement Policies, supra note 11, at 13-14.
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Court, in Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore,"'45 held that Congress' decision
to forcibly retire federal firefighters at age 55 was not based on Congress'
belief that age 55 was a BFOQ for that profession,146 and may have been
based on nothing more than stereotypical assumptions. 47 Because it
could not discern Congress' intent in mandating retirement at age 55 for
federal firefighters and law enforcement officers, it held that the statute
could not be viewed as representing a "congressional determination that
age is an occupational qualification for" these positions. 48
Irrespective of Johnson, there are other problems with reliance on the
presence of the federal retirement scheme. First, a protective service em-
ployer's failure to require any of its officers to undergo annual physical
evaluation completely "belies any claim that it [actually] thinks [its
force] should be composed of 'active, vigorous, physically capable
men.' "949 Second, the constitutionality of federal mandatory retirement
statutes is judged under a lenient rational basis test, 50 rather than the
ADEA's more stringent reasonable necessity standard. 5' Finally,
ADEA claims must be analyzed on an individual factual basis.' Con-
gress' statutory mandate of retirement for one group of federal employees
does not necessarily mean that compulsory retirement is similarly appro-
priate for all employees in that profession. Establishing a BFOQ for state
and local protective service workers on the basis of a federal statute ig-
nores the fact that the two groups of employees may "operat[e] under
different working conditions and perform[ ] significantly different job
functions."' 53
Another argument against minimum physical standards was advanced
145. 472 U.S. 353 (1985).
146. See id. at 363-64.
147. See id. at 365-66. According to the Court:
[N]either the language of the 1974 amendment nor its legislative history offers
any indicatiorf why Congress wanted to maintain the image of a "young man's
service," or why Congress thought that 55 was the proper cutoff age, or
whether Congress believed that older employees in fact could not meet the de-
mands of these occupations.
Id. at 365.
148. Id. at 367.
149. Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190, 1199 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1027 (1985) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 463, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973)).
150. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-313 (1976)
(per curiam); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 96-97 (1979); Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d 307,
313-14 (7th Cir. 1978).
151. See Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 749 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983).
152. See supra notes 32, 68.
153. Orzel, 697 F.2d at 749; accord EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 596 F. Supp. 1333, 1339
(M.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 829 F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 1109 (1988); cf Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 675 F.2d 842, 843 (6th Cir. 1982) (pres-
ence of federal FAA "age 60 rule" for commercial airline pilots does not necessarily
establish age 60 as a BFOQ for non-commercial pilots). But see Retirement Policies,
supra note 11, at 16 (stating that duties of federal, state and local protective service em-
ployees are "equally hazardous, equally demanding, and equally stressful").
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by the First Circuit in its leading case, EEOC v. City of East Provi-
dence.'54 The argument centered on the fact that the Third Circuit,
which had previously considered the minimum physical standards issue,
did not, as a matter of law, require the enforcement of minimum physical
standards before health and physical fitness could be considered reason-
ably necessary to the essence of the state police's business. 55 This con-
clusion, however, is no longer valid. On a subsequent appeal, the Third
Circuit held that absent minimum physical standards for all employees,
the Pennsylvania state police department could not justify its mandatory
retirement policy "by relying on good health and physical conditioning
as BFOQs reasonably necessary to [its] business."' 56 In dictum, the
Third Circuit explicitly repudiated EEOC v. City of East Providence, not-
ing that it represents "precisely the kind of employment discrimination
that Congress sought to eliminate by enacting the ADEA."'"
Another judicial determination is that employers do not have to en-
force minimum physical standards, but rather, can rely on their belief
that most officers below the mandatory retirement age could meet such
standards and that officers over the age in question could not. 58 Such a
view is flawed-it reflects precisely the thinking that the ADEA was in-
tended to eliminate,159 and conflicts with the ADEA's requirement that
employers empirically validate their assumptions.
Nor do minimum physical standards mandate that an employer's
screening procedures be perfect.' 60 What the Act does demand, how-
ever, is that an employer make some effort to require of its younger of-
ficers the qualifications it seeks to impose on its older ones. 16  When an
154. 798 F.2d 524 (1st Cir. 1986). City ofE. Providence was the second court of ap-
peals decision to formally reject a minimum physical standards requirement. The EEOC
had filed suit on behalf of five former city police officers who were forced to retire at age
60 pursuant to a local ordinance. See id. at 526. It argued that retirement of state police
officers at age 60 was not reasonably necessary to the essence of the department's business
because the department made absolutely no effort to ensure that younger officers could
meet the physical fitness standards imposed on older employees through their mandatory
retirement. See id. at 528-29.
155. See id. at 529. The EEOC had argued that minimum physical standards were
required under EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 768 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1985), in which the Third
Circuit held that assumptions concerning the reasonable necessity of good health and
physical strength were improper in the absence of factual findings to that effect. See City
of E. Providence, 798 F.2d at 529. The Third Circuit was particularly troubled by the fact
that the state police made absolutely no attempt to monitor the health and fitness of any
of its employees, permitting some with known disabilities to remain on the job. See id.
156. EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1109 (1988).
157. Id. at 396.
158. See City ofE. Providence, 798 F.2d at 529 n.4. The Court also stated that the City
did not have to "weed out" unfit younger officers and that a failure to do so would not
undermine "its goal of maintaining a reasonably adequate force most of whose officers
possess the requisite physical capabilities." Id.
159. See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d at 396.
160. See City of E. Providence, 798 F.2d at 529.
161. See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d at 396.
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employer strives for only an adequately fit force, the retention of older
employees does not undermine this level of mediocrity. It is only when
the employer sets particular standards so that retention of possibly unfit
employees actually subverts its commitment to health and fitness that
mandatory retirement is reasonably necessary within the scope of the
ADEA's BFOQ exception.162 Furthermore, the distinctions drawn by
most protective employers are impermissibly arbitrary because they es-
tablish inconsistent standards for employees-physical perfection for
older officers which is accomplished through mandatory retirement, and
nothing more than adequacy for younger officers.
Courts have also rejected the analytical importance, under the first
prong of the Tamiami/Criswell standard, of the actual establishment of
physical fitness programs by protective service employers. According to
the First Circuit,163 for example, New Jersey's institution of a complete
fitness evaluation program for its state police does not lead to the conclu-
sion that absent such tests, physical strength and stamina are not reason-
ably necessary job requirements. 1" The First Circuit's conclusion is
flawed, however, because it ignores the emphasis that the New Jersey
district court placed on the presence of the department's program when
it held that the State was likely to prevail at trial on the ADEA claim
filed against it.'65 According to the New Jersey district court, the pres-
ence of the State's comprehensive physical screening and fitness program
established the reasonable necessity of mandatory retirement-the use of
age as a proxy for health and fitness-to the safe and efficient perform-
ance of the department's business. 166
That nothing more than a minimal commitment to health and fitness is
required to satisfy the first prong of the Tamiami/Criswell standard is
also refuted by the New Jersey district court's recognition that had the
state police made absolutely no attempt to monitor fitness, allowing of-
ficers with serious disabilities to remain on duty, it is more likely that the
qualifications would not have been deemed reasonably necessary to the
essence of the department's business. 167
The requirement of minimum physical standards has also been charac-
terized as an unnecessary "addendum" to the first prong of the
Tamiami/Criswell standard1 68 because an employer's failure to imple-
162. See, e.g., EEOC v. New Jersey, 631 F. Supp. 1506, 1508-10 (D.N.J. 1986), afl'd,
815 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1987).
163. See EEOC v. City of E. Providence, 798 F.2d 524 (lst Cir. 1986).
164. See id. at 530.
165. A constant theme underlying the district court's analysis was that the program
demonstrated the department's strong commitment to employee health and fitness. See
EEOC v. New Jersey, 620 F. Supp. 977, 987 (D.N.J. 1985). Not only did the department
monitor its employees through a comprehensive program, it also sanctioned employees
for non-compliance either by assigning them to limited duty or by involuntarily retiring
them. See id. at 986.
166. See EEOC v. New Jersey, 631 F. Supp. at 1507, 1508-09, 1514.
167. See EEOC v. New Jersey, 620 F. Supp. at 983-84.
168. See EEOC v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n, 848 F.2d 526, 534 (5th Cir. 1988)
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ment them is merely evidence of a lack of commitment to the health and
fitness of its employees. 69 It has also been warned that minimum physi-
cal standards "do not necessarily correlate with or replicate the job du-
ties of law enforcement, and to that extent, they are a potentially
misleading gauge of what is 'reasonably necessary.' "170 It is the absence
of any standards, however, that makes this true. The job qualifications
are more likely to be inaccurate and misleading because they are never
tested against a reasonable standard-what the majority of employees are
physically capable of.
Other arguments admonish that minimum physical standards would
be expensive,' 7 1 would force employers to dismiss or discipline officers
who fail to meet the standards leading to diminished employee morale, 72
would be elevated over job performance,173 and would impede the em-
ployer's ability to continue affirmative action plans because older em-
ployees would not be mandatorily retired." 4
These arguments, however, are flawed. First, although at some point
the cost of implementing physical standards may prove onerous for local
governments, their implementation can result in financial benefits such as
a reduction in workers' compensation 75 and disability claims,' 76 thereby
lowering insurance premiums. Second, any preference for the morale of
younger employees to the detriment of older ones is characteristic of the
differential treatment of older individuals that was targeted by the
ADEA. 177 Third, concern that job performance will be overlooked is
misplaced because employers have largely ignored performance-many
BFOQ plaintiffs were capable of successfully performing their jobs and
yet were forced to retire.' 78
(Jones, J., specially concurring), vacated and remanded, 873 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1989); see
also Note, Proving That Over Age Sixty is Over the Hill for Police Officers: EEOC v.
Pennsylvania, 62 St. John's L. Rev. 361, 368-69 (1988) (additional requirement is unfair
in placing an "onerous burden on employers seeking to justify mandatory retirement
policies").
169. See EEOC v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n, 848 F.2d at 535.
170. Id. at 534.
171. See id. at 535; Retirement Policies, supra note 11, at 15; infra note 182 and accom-
panying text.
172. See EEOC v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n, 848 F.2d at 535; Retirement Policies,
supra note 11, at 50.
173. See EEOC v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n, 848 F.2d at 535.
174. See Retirement Policies, supra note 11, at 85.
175. See id. at 39.
176. See id. at 171.
177. Attention to the morale of younger employees ignores the detrimental psychologi-
cal effects of mandatory retirement on workers who are suddenly informed that because
of their age, they cannot continue to do what they may be fully capable of doing. See S.
Rep. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
504, 507.
178. See, e.g., Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 746 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983); EEOC v. County of Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d 373, 376
(9th Cir. 1982).
Finally, although employment opportunity through affirmative action is laudatory, this
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The final, and perhaps major argument advanced by virtually all pro-
tective service employers is that chronological age must be substituted
for individualized physical evaluation because there is no way to safely
and accurately screen for the presence of asymptomatic coronary artery
disease, 179 which can result in a heart attack or non-traumatic sudden
death." Employers argue that age is the primary indicator of cardiac
risk and that because the probability of a cardiac episode increases dur-
ing periods of physical exertion, older employees have a significantly
higher risk of heart attack during the performance of their job duties
than do younger ones. 8" This argument is used to satisfy both the em-
ployer's burden under the second prong of the Tamiami/Criswell stan-
dard and to explain its failure to implement minimum physical standards
under the first prong.'82
author questions whether it should involve the sacrifice of one group of employees to the
benefit of another group. Note, however, that the implementation of minimum physical
standards is not intended to bar an employer from mandatorily retiring older workers.
Rather, its purpose is to ensure that if physical requirements are imposed on older officers
by requiring their retirement, younger employees are also subject to scrutiny of their
physical ability.
179. See, e.g., EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447, 453 (8th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1985); Hoefelman v. Conservation Comm'n, 718 F.2d
281, 285-86 (8th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. New Jersey, 620 F. Supp. 977, 994 (D.N.J. 1985).
But see EEOC v. State Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 660 F. Supp. 1104,
1107-08 (N.D. Fla. 1986) (safe and non-intrusive methods for detecting the presence of
coronary artery disease are available); EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 526 F. Supp.
1135, 1141 (C.D. Ca. 1981) (the risk that an individual will suffer a heart attack is
"highly predictable"), afJ'd, 706 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073
(1984); Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 515 F. Supp. 1287, 1299 (D. Md. 1981) (individ-
ual testing to assess the level of cardiac risk is possible), rev'd on other grounds, 731 F.2d
209 (4th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 472 U.S. 353 (1985).
180. Coronary artery disease is the leading cause of death in this country in individuals
both above and below age 65. See Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine 1014 (11th
ed. 1987) [hereinafter Principles of Internal Medicine]. Coronary arteries supply blood to
the heart muscle. See EEOC v. New Jersey, 620 F. Supp. at 991. As an individual ages,
there is a gradual thickening of the artery wall, causing blockages which pose a significant
health risk because they can prevent the heart from receiving a sufficient oxygen supply,
ultimately resulting in a heart attack or non-traumatic sudden death, particularly during
periods of peak physical activity. See id.
181. See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 645 F. Supp. 1545, 1551 (M.D. Pa. 1986), vacated
and remanded, 829 F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1109 (1988); EEOC v.
New Jersey, 620 F. Supp. at 994; Beck v. Borough of Manheim, 505 F. Supp. 923, 926
(E.D. Pa. 1981); Retirement Policies, supra note 11, at 81.
182. Some employers have also argued against individualized screenings on the ground
that they are expensive. See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 645 F. Supp. at 1555-56; EEOC v.
State Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 660 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 (N.D. Fla.
1986); Retirement Policies, supra note 11, at 15. This argument is invalid, however, be-
cause economic considerations cannot serve as the basis for a BFOQ. See Smallwood v.
United Air Lines, 661 F.2d 303, 307 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1982);
Galvin v. Vermont, 598 F. Supp. 144, 149 (D. Vt. 1984); Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 596 F.
Supp. 939, 953 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), af'd, 770 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1985); cf City of Los Ange-
les v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 712 & n.23 (1978) (same proscription exists under Title
VII). This restriction was initially instituted in order to prevent employers from retiring
older workers who, because of their senior status tend to command higher salaries, and
replacing them with younger, less expensive workers. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1978).
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Medical testimony in BFOQ litigation has centered primarily on the
availability of techniques to screen individuals for coronary artery dis-
ease. Defendants' medical experts generally argue that the only method
which can conclusively detect the presence of silent CAD is cardiac cath-
eterization,18 3 an invasive and risky procedure that rarely is used
diagnostically.' Focusing on cardiac catheterization, however, ignores
other less invasive diagnostic techniques, particularly the exercise stress
test, 85 combined with simultaneous consideration of cardiac risk fac-
tors--certain "conditions and habits present more frequently in individu-
als who develop CAD than in the general population."'8 6
The results of this combination appear to be an extremely accurate
short-term predictor of the likelihood that a given individual will have a
cardiac event.'8 7 Yet, defendants' medical experts have continually re-
jected its predictive value."88 Although many risk factors are easily de-
tectible,18 9 virtually the only one consistently recognized is the most
The rationale was subsequently extended to a complete interdiction of the use of financial
arguments to justify age discrimination under the BFOQ exception.
183. See, e.g., Dep't of Highway Safety, 660 F. Supp. at 1108; EEOC v. New Jersey,
620 F. Supp. 977, 991 (D.N.J. 1985).
Cardiac catheterization involves the insertion of a catheter into the patient's vein so
that x-rays can be taken of the coronary artery. See id.
184. Cardiac catheterization can result in bleeding, loss of a limb through blood clot-
ting, and can actually induce a heart attack and even death. See id.
185. See Principles of Internal Medicine, supra note 180, at 1018. During the test, a
subject is connected to an electrocardiogram monitor while walking on a treadmill. As
the test progresses, grade and speed are increased, with the effects of increased stress on
the heart monitored by the EKG. Its results are not perfect, however; subjects with
coronary artery disease have tested negative and vice versa. See EEOC v. New Jersey, 620
F. Supp. at 992-94; EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 500 F. Supp. 1135, 1142 (D. Minn. 1980),
aff'd, 671 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1982). As a result, most protective service employers have
imputed only a limited usefulness to it. See, e.g., EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Pa-
trol, 748 F.2d 447, 453 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1985); EEOC v. New
Jersey, 620 F. Supp. at 992-93; see also City of St. Paul, 500 F. Supp. at 1141-42 (exercise
stress test does not simulate actual environmental factors that create physical and mental
stress on the job, further reducing accuracy in employment areas such as firefighting).
186. Principles of Internal Medicine, supra note 180, at 1019. According to the risk
factor concept, "a person with at least one risk factor is more likely to develop [CAD]
and is likely to do so earlier than a person with no risk factors." Id.
187. See EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984); EEOC v. State Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles,
660 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 (N.D. Fla. 1986).
Short-term prediction is all that is required. In a Tamiami-like hiring situation, the
employer must evaluate what is likely to happen to an employee prospectively over the
long-term and there is uncertainty about the physiological effects of prolonged exposure
to physical stress. With current employees, conversely, the effects of continuous exposure
to long-term physical demands have begun to accrue and consequently, can be more eas-
ily assessed. By subjecting employees to these tests at least annually, even gradual
changes in medical profile should be apparent.
188. See, e.g., EEOC v. Missouri, 748 F.2d at 453; EEOC v. New Jersey, 620 F. Supp. at
993.
189. See Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 596 F. Supp. 939, 951 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), affid, 770
F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1985).
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obvious-aging.1 90
Risk factors can be categorized by their level of reversibility. 191 The
irreversible risk factors are gender,192 genetic traits,193 and age. 194 The
completely reversible factors are cigarette smoking, 95 hypertension' 96
and obesity.' 97 The partially reversible factors are triglyceride and cho-
lesterol levels, g' low HDL levels,199 and hyperglycemia and diabetes
mellitus.2 °° Other factors such as physical activity,20 1 diet and the nature
of the job performed202 are also related to and can accelerate the inci-
dence of CAD.
190. See, e.g., Dep't of Highway Safety, 660 F. Supp. at 1107; EEOC v. New Jersey,
620 F. Supp. 977, 994-95 (D.N.J. 1985). Aging is only one of several important factors,
however, all of which interact synergistically. Additionally, most CAD sufferers below
age 65 have at least one identifiable risk factor other than "aging per se." See Principles
of Internal Medicine, supra note 180, at 1019.
191. See Principles of Internal Medicine, supra note 180, at 1019.
192. Males are at a higher risk of developing CAD than women. See id.
193. There are indications that premature CAD may be familial. See id. This is im-
portant because it illustrates that a younger officer is not necessarily immune, especially if
there is a family history of premature heart disease.
194. Aging is an extremely complex risk factor because many other factors such as
hypertension are age-related. See id. at 1019.
195. Cigarette smoking is an extremely potent risk factor. One-pack-a-day smokers
are 70 percent more likely to die prematurely from CAD than non-smokers. See id. at
1021. Recognizing this danger, several jurisdictions have imposed no smoking regula-
tions on protective service employees. See Retirement Policies, supra note 11, at 107-08.
196. Middle-aged hypertensive men have more than five times the risk of CAD than do
individuals without hypertension. See Principles of Internal Medicine, supra note 180, at
1021. Physical activity and diet may even be causally linked to age-related hypertension.
See id. at 1021-22.
197. Abdominal obesity is directly related to the incidence of CAD. See id. at 1021.
198. Recent studies indicate that cholesterol levels may actually be the best predictor
of heart disease. See EEOC v. State Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 660 F.
Supp. 1104, 1107 (N.D. Fla. 1986).
There is a direct correlation between elevated cholesterol and triglyceride levels and
premature CAD, with at least a three to five-fold increase in the risk of myocardial in-
farction in individuals between the ages of 30 and 49, see Principles of Internal Medicine,
supra note 180, at 1019, an age range well below all mandatory retirement ages.
199. HDL (high-density lipoprotein) levels are inversely related to the development of
premature CAD-the higher the HDL level, the lower the likelihood that an individual
will develop CAD. See id. at 1020. Extrinsic factors also affect HDL-smoking de-
creases HDL levels while regular strenuous exercise increases them. See id. at 1021.
200. See id. at 1021.
Diabetics are at least twice as likely as non-diabetics to have heart problems, with a
marked increase in this risk for younger diabetics. See id.
201. Studies indicate that the more physically active an individual is the less suscepti-
ble he is to sudden cardiac death. See id.
202. Data suggests that firefighters are twice as likely to develop chronic heart and
lung disease by their early fifties as the general population. See Retirement Policies, supra
note 11, at 55; see also EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 500 F. Supp. 1135, 1140-41 (D. Minn.
1980) (higher incidence of heart and lung disease in firefighters than in general popula-
tion), affid, 671 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1982).
This provides an excellent argument for mandatory retirement at age 55 for firefighters.
The validity of the argument, however, is severely undercut when a fire department re-
fuses to assess the cardiac health of younger firefighters who smoke, or who are over-
weight or who have elevated cholesterol levels. This lack of compulsory evaluation
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Although analysis of cardiac risk factors may be substantially proba-
tive in screening for the presence of CAD,20 3 a question unanswered by
courts is the degree of accuracy employers should demand of tests to
detect CAD. Protective service employers have argued that public safety
concerns mandate the relative precision of techniques such as cardiac
catheterization, which they then reject because of its dangers. By requir-
ing certainty of detection, however, employers undermine their ability to
effectively serve the public by ignoring the risk factors which can lead to
the premature development of CAD in younger individuals who, because
of their lower seniority, are more likely to be assigned to physically active
duty.2°
Overlooking these risk factors or according them minimal attention
seriously belies the legitimacy of employer concerns about the dangers of
CAD. The younger field officer or firefighter who is out of shape, or who
smokes, is arguably a likelier candidate for a heart attack than is the
older administrative officer who possesses only one risk factor-his
age.2°5 If an employer is honestly concerned that an employee with
CAD may not be able to handle the physical strain of his job, it is incon-
sistent to retain a younger officer with known CAD while mandatorily
retiring his older co-worker on the suspicion that he may suffer from
CAD. °206 Furthermore, implementing minimum physical standards will
encourage employees to remain physically active in order to meet them,
providing an ancillary benefit-reduction in their overall susceptibility to
developing CAD. 0 7
B. Minimum Physical Standards-Why They Are Necessary
The opposite view, adopted by two Circuit Courts of Appeal outright
and by a third under certain circumstances, is that as a matter of law,
protective service employers are precluded from satisfying the first prong
of the Tamiami/Criswell standard in the absence of the development and
enforcement of minimum physical standards for all employees.2"'
endangers not only the public, but also the firefighter, particularly if he is unaware that an
easily correctable risk factor may amplify an already exaggerated risk.
203. See, e.g., EEOC v. Kentucky State Police Dep't, 860 F.2d 665, 667 (6th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1066 (1989); EEOC v. State Dep't of Highway Safety &
Motor Vehicles, 660 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (N.D. Fla. 1986); Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 596
F. Supp. 939, 951 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), afl'd, 770 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1985).
204. On many protective service forces, older, higher-ranking employees tend to hold
supervisory or administrative positions. See, e.g., EEOC v. University of Texas Health
Science Center, 710 F.2d 1091, 1093 (5th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. City of Minneapolis, 537
F. Supp. 750, 757 (D. Minn. 1982); Retirement Policies, supra note 11 at 166-67. A
corollary to this is that younger, less senior officers are generally assigned to more physi-
cally active duty.
205. See generally Retirement Policies, supra note 11, at 167.
206. See EEOC v. Kentucky 860 F.2d at 667; EEOC v. Tennessee Wildlife Resources
Agency, 859 F.2d 24, 26 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1342 (1989).
207. See Retirement Policies, supra note 11, at 39, 170.
208. See EEOC v. Kentucky, 860 F.2d at 669 (held statute mandating retirement at age
55 for state police officers violative of ADEA); EEOC v. Tennessee, 859 F.2d at 26
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When Congress promulgated the ADEA, it recognized that although
the aged may not be a "'discrete and insular'" minority,2 °9 they do re-
quire special protection from a history of arbitrary discrimination in em-
ployment. Consequently, the ADEA imposes a stringent burden of proof
on employers, requiring them to prove that their mandatory retirement
policies do in fact further their overriding interest in promoting public
safety.210 In the absence of minimum physical standards, however, the
mandatory retirement of protective service employees at some presump-
tive age of physical incapacity is only rationally related to furthering the
employer's interest in public safety. It is undoubtedly rational for a pro-
tective service employer to retire older employees-they may present a
health risk which can interfere with the employer's primary function of
promoting the safety of the general public. Older employees are also eas-
ier to isolate than younger ones with health and fitness problems.
Mandatory retirement, however, has no appreciable effect on promoting
public safety when an employer refuses to identify and sanction younger
officers with health problems.
Although periodic physical tests may have some degree of imprecision,
they are still "useful both in spotting existing physical disabilities and in
identifying high-risk individuals, '211 and employers that are seriously
concerned with the physical and mental fitness of their employees have
used them to identify individuals with high-risk traits.212 Only when
physical standards and testing are imposed for all employees does the
margin of error in such tests bolster the employer's claim that mandatory
retirement is reasonably necessary for certain presumptively high-risk in-
dividuals who can no longer be tested accurately.21 3
When an employer makes a legitimate effort to examine all employees
for traits which preclude safe and effective performance, retirement of
older officers is reasonably necessary. Otherwise, the employer's evident
commitment to health and fitness may be undermined by the higher risks
older officers face, and for which they can no longer be accurately tested.
Absent minimum physical standards, however, it is virtually irrelevant to
the promotion of public safety whether a small number of older employ-
ees actually possess certain traits, because the employer makes no effort
to ensure that the majority of its force-younger employees-do not pos-
(EEOC successfully challenged statute requiring wildlife officers to retire at age 55);
EEOC v. Mississippi, 837 F.2d 1398, 1402 (5th Cir. 1988) (invalidating statute prescrib-
ing both a maximum hiring age and a mandatory retirement age for state conservation
officers); EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 1987), (rejecting reasonable
necessity of statute mandatorily retiring all uniformed state police officers at age 60), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1109 (1988).
209. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per
curiam) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938)).
210. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
211. Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190, 1198 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1027 (1985); see also cases cited supra note 109.
212. See Heiar, 746 F.2d at 1198.
213. See id.
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sess them.z14 In some instances, younger officers with known physical
ailments have been permitted to remain on active duty. 1 5 Moreover,
many older employees in excellent health/physical condition have been
retired.216 This dichotomous treatment is actually more detrimental to
the public than the retention of older officers. Younger employees are
likely to be assigned to physically active field duty, and because they lack
the experience and judgment of older employees, they are more likely to
find themselves in dangerous situations.2 17
Second, although the ADEA does not prohibit employers from assum-
ing a correlation between age and physical ability, it does proscribe the
retention of some employees and the mandatory retirement of others
based on subjective stereotypical belief alone-the employer must pro-
vide some factual foundation to support its assumptions.21 8 In the ab-
sence of minimum standards for all employees, older workers are singled
out for retirement without any regard to whether they are still competent
to discharge the duties of their jobs. Conversely, younger employees are
judged competent solely by virtue of their age.
Employers need not develop tests that can perfectly monitor and dif-
ferentiate between physically fit employees and unfit ones; rather, they
need only establish a factual basis on which a court could determine that
good health and physical ability are BFOQs reasonably necessary to the
essence of its business.2 19 "[TIhere is no essential qualification that age
can stand as a proxy for," however, when employers fail to determine
whether younger employees do indeed have these qualifications and to
what degree. 2 Yet many protective service employers, because they fail
to periodically screen employees, are relatively unaware of the level of
fitness of any of their officers, young or old.221 Moreover, other employ-
ers are unfamiliar with the effects of aging on the performance of their
214. See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 1109 (1988).
215. See, e.g., EEOC v. Kentucky State Police Dep't, 860 F.2d 665, 667 (6th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S. CT. 1066 (1989); EEOC v. Mississippi, 654 F. Supp. 1168,
1176 (S.D. Miss. 1987), affd, 837 F.2d 1398 (5th Cir. 1988); EEOC v. City of Bowling
Green, 607 F. Supp. 524, 525 (W.D. Ky. 1985).
216. See, e.g., Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 746 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983); EEOC v. State Dep't of Highway Safety, 660 F. Supp.
1104, 1105 (N.D. Fla. 1986); EEOC v. Mississippi, 654 F. Supp. 1168, 1176 (S.D. Miss.
1987), aJf'd 837 F.2d 1398 (5th Cir. 1988); City of Bowling Green, 607 F. Supp. at 525.
217. See Retirement Policies, supra note 11, at 166-67.
218. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
219. See EEOC v. Mississippi, 837 F.2d 1398, 1400 (5th Cir. 1988).
220. See EEOC v. Mississippi, 837 F.2d at 1400 (emphasis in original); see also EEOC
v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n., 873 F.2d 97, 102 (5th Cir. 1989) (Rubin, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part).
221. See, e.g., EEOC v. State Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 660 F. Supp.
1104, 1107, 1110 (N.D. Fla. 1986); EEOC v. City of Bowling Green, 607 F. Supp. 524,
525 (W.D. Ky. 1985); EEOC v. City of Minneapolis, 537 F. Supp. 750, 754 (D. Minn.
1982); see also Retirement Policies, supra note 11, at 37 (majority of police and fire depart-
ments are unfamiliar with officer fitness levels due to lack of periodic physical fitness/
health screening).
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officers.222
Age-neutral minimum physical standards also provide a vehicle for
eliminating employer reliance on stereotype by subjecting all employees
to uniform job requirements, rather than mandatorily retiring older indi-
viduals based upon a presumed lack of physical ability.22 3 They offer a
non-discriminatory opportunity for empirically validating an employer's
opinion that younger employees are physically capable and its suspicion
that older ones are either physically incompetent or untestable.
Third, minimum physical standards remedy the arbitrary and differen-
tial treatment of older employees because a BFOQ is justified only when
substantially all of them either regularly fail to meet the minimum stan-
dards, or where it is actually unfeasible to develop and implement testing
to determine individual ability. Although the ultimate result of compul-
sory retirement for older employees may still be the same, it would be
based on actual proof of inability rather than speculation, and more im-
portantly, the retention of younger officers would not be based on as-
sumptions concerning youth and ability.
Fourth, the implementation of such standards ensures that the em-
ployer's qualifications are supported by objective fact and that they are
legitimately imposed.224 These standards circumscribe the broad discre-
tion in establishing job qualifications that is afforded employers under
Tamiami.225 They prevent the imposition of job qualifications that are
unduly stringent or arbitrary because they compel the employer to prove
that younger employees can indeed meet these standards, thereby making
it difficult for an employer to impose qualifications designed to subvert
the Act. They are also objectively neutral rather than subjective, repre-
senting a validated level of ability possessed by the majority of the officers
on the force.
Fifth, minimum physical standards serve as a basic check on "an em-
ployer's discretion in establishing a BFOQ defense. ' 226 In the absence of
an inquiry under the first prong, the analysis under the second is reduced
to an evidentiary battle of expert witnesses, with no empirical proof that
the requirements in question are indeed reasonably necessary.227 Mini-
mum physical standards provide a threshold hurdle that the employer
must overcome in order to reach the second prong of the test, thus clos-
ing a major loophole under the second prong of the standard.
Sixth, an employer's failure to implement minimum physical standards
betrays the legitimacy of its avowed concern for the health and fitness of
its employees, and reflects the fact that such qualifications are not really
222. See, e.g., EEOC v. City of Minneapolis, 537 F. Supp. 750, 754 (D. Minn. 1982).
223. See EEOC v. Mississippi, 837 F.2d 1398, 1401 (5th Cir. 1988).
224. See id.
225. See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 n.30 (5th Cir. 1976).
226. EEOC v. Mississippi, 837 F.2d at 1401.
227. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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reasonably necessary.228 Employers continually fail to take any steps to
monitor the continued health and fitness of employees. 229 In some cases,
officers were actually hired with known physical disabilities,230 while in
others, officers with serious and known medical problems, including
heart conditions, were retained.2 1  The forced retirement of older em-
ployees thus represents a selective enforcement of the employer's job re-
quirements and is an unjustifiable abrogation of their right under the
ADEA to be free from arbitrary and discriminatory treatment.
Finally, by implementing minimum physical standards combined with
a program of regular testing, protective service employers stand to reap
two substantial benefits. First, they may be able to avoid having to use
the BFOQ exception to justify their decisions. The ADEA does not pro-
hibit an employer from disciplining or dismissing an employee for good
232 ~ ocause, irrespective of whether the employee is within the class pro-
tected under the Act. By enforcing legitimate minimum physical stan-
dards on a non-discriminatory basis, the failure of an employee to meet
the standards required for his particular job would be grounds for dismis-
sal for cause.233 The Act also permits employers to base differential
treatment of employees on reasonable factors other than age.234 If all
employees are required to meet objective, age-neutral physical standards
that are directly related to the job duties performed, the employer could
claim that its employment determinations are based on a reasonable fac-
tor other than age-physical fitness.
The implementation of minimum standards also may significantly re-
duce the evidentiary difficulties employers have encountered in some ju-
risdictions under the second prong of the Tamiami/Criswell standard.
Specifically, the employer would need to invoke the BFOQ exception
only where it seeks to mandatorily retire older employees rather than
continuing to subject them to physical testing. By implementing mini-
mum physical standards for all employees, its evidentiary burden under
the first prong of the Tamiami/Criswell standard would be met.
228. See, e.g., EEOC v. Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency, 859 F.2d 24, 26 (6th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1342 (1989); EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d 392, 395
(3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1109 (1988); Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d
1190, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985).
229. See cases cited supra note 221.
230. See EEOC v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n, 848 F.2d 526, 532-33 (5th Cir.
1988), vacated and remanded, 873 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1989); EEOC v. Mississippi, 654 F.
Supp. 1168, 1174 (S.D. Miss. 1987), affid 837 F.2d 1398 (5th Cir. 1988).
231. See cases cited supra note 215.
232. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3) (1982).
233. See Retirement Policies, supra note 11, at 108-09.
234. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1982). Under the reasonable factors other than age
defense, the employer is permitted to make hiring and firing decisions regarding older
employees if it "can demonstrate that such action resulted from consideration of factors
other than chronological age, such as job performance." Comment, Age Discrimination
in Employment-The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Defense-Balancing the In-
terest of the Older Worker in Acquiring and Continuing Employment Against the Interest
in Public Safety, 24 Wayne L. Rev. 1339, 1342 (1978).
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Under the second prong, if the employer finds that its tests for assess-
ing compliance with its minimum physical standards are impractical or
impossible to accurately administer to older employees, or if it can
demonstrate that most older employees routinely fail these tests, invoca-
tion of the BFOQ exception would be appropriate. Ultimately, the im-
plementation of minimum physical standards might provide protective
service employers with actual empirical evidence to support their suppo-
sitions concerning the diminished physical ability of older employees, ob-
viating the need to rely on expert medical testimony that a court may or
may not find persuasive.
CONCLUSION
In promulgating the ADEA, Congress recognized that employment
determinations should be based on individual ability rather than age.
Although the BFOQ exception was intended to be a narrow deviation
from this rule, it has been impermissibly extended where protective ser-
vice employers are concerned. By failing to require the implementation
of minimum physical standards under the first prong of the Tamiami!
Criswell standard, courts have ignored both congressional intent under
the Act and the administrative guidelines issued in interpretation of it.
Minimum physical standards are required in order to comply with Con-
gress' purpose in promulgating the ADEA, to limit employer discretion
in applying the BFOQ exception in circumvention of the ADEA and to
promote physically fit protective service forces at all ages.
Meryl G. Finkelstein
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